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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of three essays on firm dynamics and development. These
essays consider the interaction between the dynamics of allocative efficiency and
economic growth from the three different perspectives.
The first essay quantitatively analyses the role of allocative efficiency in explain-
ing growth miracles. It builds a heterogeneous firm model with entry and exit. The
model economy converges to a more efficient steady state by selecting more produc-
tive firms and reallocating resources to them. Frictions obstruct firm selection and
labour reallocation and delay the convergence for decades. Meanwhile, slow efficien-
cy improvement continuously increases productivity and contributes to miraculous
growth. In counterfactual experiments, higher-level frictions decrease both the ag-
gregate productivity in the new steady state and the speed of convergence.
The second essay investigates how technological diffusion could shape the high
productivity dispersion and exaggerate the so-called allocative inefficiency in emerg-
ing economies. It develops a growth model with heterogeneous firms and simulates
the dynamics of its productivity distribution during a catch-up process. Firms in the
model economy learn about new technology from the world frontier. Their learning
speeds differ. When they start to catch up to the frontier, fast learners get close to
the frontier in a short time while slow learners remain close to their original low
productivity. Consequently, productivity dispersion increases. Furthermore, when
adjustment costs exist, marginal productivity is correlated with productivity, so its
dispersion increases as well. The economy appears more inefficient. After a long
period of learning, slow learners ultimately narrow the gap to frontier. In the new
steady state, the productivity dispersion is low again and the economy once again
appears efficient even without the reductions to adjustment costs. In the simulation
of China, the economy has already passed the bottom of U-shaped pattern. The
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6productivity dispersion and so-called allocative inefficiency keeps decreasing until
convergence. The result suggests that the different productivity dispersions in e-
merging and developed economies can be a consequence of their different stages of
development.
The third essay explores the role of recessions in resource reallocation. It focuses
on capital reallocation from the low-productivity state sector to the high-productivity
private sector. During recessions, state-owned enterprises liquidate capital to repay
debt. Private firms take over the realised resources. This improves allocative effi-
ciency. The timing of a recession is important. In the early stage of transformation,
private firms are too small to take over all the liquidated capital. The impact of the
insufficient resource reallocation is limited. However, the recession influences the
economy for a longer period, so the cumulative welfare gain is large. By contrast,
a late recession without fire sales generates a large temporary welfare gain, but a
relatively small cumulative welfare gain.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Empirical evidence suggests that the allocative efficiency of an economy is related to
its stage of development. Cross-country studies (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, & Scar-
petta, 2013; Hsieh & Klenow, 2009) show that low productivity firms hold too many
resources in emerging economies. This so-called misallocation drives large losses on
productivity and output. Conversely, resource allocation in developed economies
is closer to optimal distribution. The efficiency difference is able to explain a large
proportion of cross-country income differences. Historical analyses reveal a similar
relationship between allocative efficiency and the stages of development. For exam-
ple, Ziebarth (2013) finds that allocative efficiency of the U.S. in the late 19th century
is similar to that of China and India currently. The three economies are different
in terms of in market structure and institution but similar in levels of developmen-
t. Now the U.S. economy reaches a more advanced level and its efficiency is much
higher.
This thesis studies the relationship between efficiency and development. It is a
collection of three self-contained essays that explore the phenomenon in three direc-
tions. Chapter 2 analyses the contribution of efficiency improvement in economic
growth, particularly in miraculous growth. Chapter 3 studies the reverse impact
how a catch-up process influences the so-called allocative efficiency. Chapter 4 stud-
ies the mechanism of efficiency improvement and explores how recessions influence
1
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reallocation.
The three chapters adopt the same methodology. First, I build models for each
chapter. In Chapter 2, I extend the Hopenhayn model (Hopenhayn, 1992; Hopen-
hayn & Rogerson, 1993) by adding adjustment frictions and entry/exit barriers. In
Chapter 3, I add both technological diffusion and adjustment costs to the Hopenhayn
model. In Chapter 4, I model the transformation of low-productivity firms (Song, S-
toresletten, & Zilibotti, 2011) with an imperfect financial market (Kiyotaki & Moore,
1997). Then, I set the parameter values to match the data. In Chapter 2 and 3, the ma-
jor parameters are estimated from the firm-level data by the Olley and Pakes’ (1996)
menthod, the ordinary least squares regression, the maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE), and the simulated method of moments (SMM). In Chapter 4, parameter val-
ues are chosen based on data moments or model assumptions. Finally, I simulate
the model economy and study the dynamics. In Chapter 2 and 3, I simulate the
transitional dynamics and study the co-movement of economic growth and so-called
allocative efficiency. In Chapter 4, I simulate the transformation with different shocks
and study the impact of recessions.
The remaining of this chapter provides separate summaries for each essay.
1.2 Allocative efficiency and growth miracles
Many economies have experienced a period of high-speed growth. The causes of
such unexpected economic performance remains controversial. In Chapter 2, I post
a new hypothesis that the improvement of allocative efficiency plays an importan-
t role in miraculous growth. I study firm dynamics in an environment that labour
adjustment and firm entry and exit are all costly. The analytical framework is extend-
ed from the Hopenhayn model. I estimate the model parameters to match Chinese
firm-level data. The firm level productivity is estimated by Olley and Pakes’ (1996)
method. The dynamics of productivity is estimated by the ordinary least squares
regression. The adjustment, entry, and exit costs are estimated by the SMM. Then, I
§1.3 Technological diffusion, productivity dispersion, and so-called allocative inefficiency3
simulate the transition from the current stage to the new steady state and decompose
the growth to ascertain the contribution of efficiency improvement.
Efficiency improvement is the major cause of the miraculous growth in the model
economy. Allocative efficiency is improved when the market selects high-productivity
firms and reallocates labour to them. Adjustment costs slow down the process for
decades. Meanwhile, slow efficiency improvement continues to contribute to eco-
nomic growth. The contribution is higher in the early stage of the transition. In the
same stage, the economy experiences high-speed growth. Then, efficiency improve-
ment slows down until it finally stops when the economy reaches a new stationary
distribution. Miraculous growth disappears as well. In counterfactual experiments,
higher-level adjustment costs delay the convergence and lower the aggregate produc-
tivity and output in the new steady state.
1.3 Technological diffusion, productivity dispersion, and so-
called allocative inefficiency
In Chapter 3, I explore how economic growth shapes the dispersed productivity dis-
tribution and inefficient resource allocation in emerging economies. Particularly, the
study highlights the role of technological diffusion. I extend the Hopenhayn model
by including technological adoption and labour adjustment costs. The estimation
strategy is similar to that applied in Chapter 2. I estimate the firm-level productivity
by the Olley and Pakes’ (1996) method, the dynamics of productivity by the MLE,
and the adjustment costs by the SMM.
I simulate the economic transition from a low-tech steady state to a high-tech
steady state and analyse the dynamics of the dispersion of labour productivity. Dur-
ing the catch-up process, the dispersion of productivity increases at the beginning,
and then, decreases to a low level again in the new steady state. The adjustment costs
remain constant over time, so the dynamics of the dispersion is purely driven by the
technological diffusion. In the economy, firms learn about new technology from the
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world frontier. Their learning speeds differ. In the transition, fast learners catch up
to the frontier very quickly while slow learners remain close to their original low
technology. The dispersion of productivity increase. Then, slower learners also move
closer the frontier after a long period of learning. The distribution of productivity
slowly narrows until it finally reaches the stationary distribution. Furthermore, firm-
s face adjustment costs and delay labour adjustment as a response, so the marginal
productivity of labour comoves with the productivity dynamics. The pattern of the
dispersion movement is U-shaped too. This indicates that the cross-country differ-
ences on productivity dispersion may be partially driven by the different stages of
development.
In the simulation of China, the economy has already passed the bottom of the
U-shaped curves. The productivity dispersion keeps decreasing until converge. The
resource allocation also becomes more efficient.
1.4 Reallocation through recession
In Chapter 4, I study how recessions influence the transformation of state-owned
enterprise (SOEs). SOEs are less productive than private firms in general, but they
dominate the economies of many countries, such as pre-reform Russia or China (D-
jankov & Murrell, 2002; Megginson & Netter, 2001; Murrell, 1993; Rodrik, 2006).
Hence, the issue of how to reallocate resources from SOEs to private firms is a key
to improve the efficiency of these countries. A number of literature (see the reviews
written by Hopenhayn, 2014a; Restuccia & Rogerson, 2017) consider how reducing
distortions improves allocative efficiency. This chapter introduces a new channel
whereby recessions can boost the capital allocation from SOEs to private firms.
I model the capital reallocation from SOEs to private firms (Song et al., 2011) with
an imperfect financial market (Kiyotaki & Moore, 1997). The parameter values are
chosen to match the transformation of SOEs in China. I simulate the transformation
of the model economy with negative shocks, and then, analyse the impact of these
§1.5 Organisation 5
shocks on capital reallocation and social welfare. I also compare the influence of
the recessions at different stages of the transition. Some model assumptions and
estimations are simplified and will be adjusted in future works.
At the beginning of the transformation, SOEs hold most capital of the economy.
However, private firms have higher productivity, so they accumulate capital faster
and ultimately dominate the market. Recessions boost the transformation. When
SOEs are affected by a negative shock, they liquidate capital to repay debt. Pri-
vate firms are more productive but face the same collateral constraint, so they have
more liquidity and are able to purchase the liquidated capital. Consequently, the
liquidation market improves allocative efficiency and boosts long-run growth. While
recessions cause a temporary welfare loss, the cumulative effect is positive.
The timing of a recession is important. In the early stage of transformation, pri-
vate firms are too small to take over all the liquidated capital. In this scenario, a
recession causes a large temporary welfare loss and a small efficiency gain. Howev-
er, the recession boosts the transformation from an early period, so the cumulative
welfare gain is relatively large. By contrast, a late-arriving recession can fully real-
locate the liquidated capital to private firms, resulting in a small temporary welfare
loss and a large efficiency gain. However, since the recession only influences the
late segment of the transition, the cumulative welfare gain is relatively small. The
opposite short-run and long-run effects reveal the importance of the time horizon in
welfare and policy analyses.
1.5 Organisation
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapters 2 to 4 present the core research material-
s. Chapter 2 evaluates the role of allocative efficiency in relation to growth miracles.
Chapter 3 studies the relationship between technological diffusion and productivi-
ty dispersion. Chapter 4 explores how recessions influences resource reallocation.
Finally, chapter 5 sets out the conclusions that can be drawn from these essays.
6 Introduction
Chapter 2
The road to efficiency: allocative
efficiency and growth miracles
2.1 Introduction
Many economies experience dramatic high-speed growth for decades, like the Chi-
nese economic boom since 1978. The explanations of these growth miracles are still
controversial. This paper posts a new hypothesis that growth miracle is also a pro-
cess of slow efficiency convergence. Transitional economies increase efficiency by
selecting high-productivity firms and reallocating resource to them. Costly labour
adjustment and firm selection delay the efficiency improvement. During the slow
convergence, efficiency improvement keeps boosting productivity growth. Eventual-
ly, the economic growth slows down while reaching steady state.
The study is motivated by two stylised facts. First, developed economies are more
efficient than emerging countries in the sense of resource allocation across firms and
selection of good firms. The phenomenon has been shown in many cross-country
empirical studies (e.g. Akcigit, Alp, & Peters, 2016; Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, & S-
carpetta, 2013; Hsieh & Klenow, 2009). The difference indicates that the process of
catch-up is also a process of efficiency improvement. Second, efficiency improvemen-
t takes time. It is much slower than the prediction of neoclassical models (Buera &
Shin, 2013). For example, China, the largest emerging economy, experienced mirac-
ulous growth for four decades, but its allocative efficiency is still much lower than in
7
8 The road to efficiency: allocative efficiency and growth miracles
the United States (Hsieh & Klenow, 2009). India, the second largest emerging econ-
omy, has enjoyed economic boom since 1991. Yet, its current allocative efficiency is
also significantly lower than in the United States (Bils, Klenow, & Ruane, 2017). The
slow efficiency improvement can contribute to growth for a long time.
In this paper, I build a model which endogenously generates temporary high
speed growth. The economy comprises heterogenous firms with entry and exit, as set
by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). Firms face productivity shocks and incumbents
adjust labour or exit the market as a response. The labour adjustment is costly,
so firms cannot adjust labour immediately to the optimal level. The productivity
shocks are persistent, so they will adjust labour to a more efficient level in the long
run. When a shock is very negative, firms can exit the market as a response. It is
also costly. In addition to the exit cost, firms have to pay adjustment costs to lay off
all the employees. When the exit costs are higher than the deficit, a firm will stay in
the market even if it is unprofitable. On the other hand, the economy allows entry
of new firms. Potential entrants make the decision of entry based on the expected
value of a new firms and entry costs. Entry costs comprise two elements. First,
an entrant has to pay a fixed cost to release its productivity and the value of the
firm. Second, it has to pay the adjustment costs for its initial recruitment. These
costs block the entry of new firm, and reduce the size of the market. Because of
the costly entry, exit, and labour adjustment, efficiency improvement takes decades
in the simulations. Meanwhile, the increasing efficiency consistently contributes to
economic growth.
The estimation of value of parameters targets Chinese manufacturing firms. The
estimation is divided into three stages for the sake of reducing computational com-
plexity and increasing robustness. First, discounting factor, labour supply, and initial
distribution are predetermined as the real values in the data. Second, the firm-level
productivity is estimated using the Olley and Pakes’ (1996) method. The stochastic
process of productivity is estimated using a regression on the firm-level productivity
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panel. Third, since the model does not have an analytical form solution, the parame-
ters of adjustment costs, entry cost, and exit cost are estimated by simulated method
of moment (SMM). The simulation with all the estimates shows a similar pattern of
firm dynamics as in the real data.
I simulate the firm dynamics after 2007, the most recent year before the Global
Financial Crisis. The simulated economy converges to a more efficient stationary
distribution. The economy enjoys high-speed growth during the convergence process
and stops growing up when reaching steady state.
I decompose the growth to see the contribution of efficiency improvement. In the
model economy, growth is driven by five engines: (i) improvement of allocative effi-
ciency, (ii) expansion of market size, (iii) exit of low-productivity firms, (iv) entry of
high-productivity firms, and (v) productivity progress of survival firms. The growth
decomposition shows that allocative efficiency plays the most important role in the
periods of growth miracle.
I run counterfactual experiments with different levels of adjustment costs. In the
experiments, adjustment costs influence both the convergence speed and the alloca-
tive efficiency in the new steady state. When labour adjustment and firms selection
are cost-free, the economy directly reaches the optimal distribution. Otherwise, the
transition takes time. Higher adjustment costs lead to slower convergence. In the
new steady state, firms still face idiosyncratic shocks and have to adjust labour or
exit the market. Higher costs reduce the efficiencies of resource reallocation and firm
selection, so reduce the aggregate productivity in the steady state.
The literature suggests that growth miracles happens when an economy con-
verges to its balanced growth path (e.g. Hausmann, Pritchett, & Rodrik, 2005). This
study follows this line of thought and suggests a new channel, efficiency improve-
ment during the convergence. It links the discussion of growth miracles to recent
literature on efficiency and productivity (Restuccia & Rogerson, 2008; Hsieh & K-
lenow, 2009; Bartelsman et al., 2013).
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Buera and Shin (2013), and Moll (2014) study reallocation dynamics and produc-
tivity growth and both focus on financial frictions. In both studies, frictions do not
exercise much influence on the long-run performance, as firms could release finan-
cial constraint by self-saving (Kiyotaki & Moore, 1997). Conversely, in the model of
this study labour adjustment costs still matter in steady state. The result seems more
consistent with empirical evidence from labour market (Prescott, 2004).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, I build a model of firm
dynamics. In section 3, I introduce a productivity accounting approach for the model.
In Section 4, I describe the estimation of the parameters of the model. In Section 5, I
present the simulations of reallocation dynamics and growth of the model economy.
In Section 6, I demonstrated the impact of frictions in counterfactual experiments.
Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2.2 Model
I construct a heterogeneous firm model with adjustment frictions and productivity
shocks, which is built on the Hopenhayn model (Hopenhayn, 1992; Hopenhayn &
Rogerson, 1993).
Households.– A measure 1 of households live in the economy. Every household pro-
vides a measure L of labour. The households are consumers, labour providers, and
owners of establishments in the economy. Since the study focuses on firm behaviour,
I simplify the household behaviour by three assumptions. First, the economy only
produces a nondurable good, so the households have to consume all the product-
s at the end of each period. Intertemporal transfer does not exist in the economy.
Second, leisure does not generate utility, so the labour supply is perfectly inelastic.
Third, households own all the establishments and equally distribute profits, so the
welfare maximisation problem is equivalent to the output maximisation problem.
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Incumbent firms– A firm is characterised by its productivity zi,t and last-period labour
li,t−1. It uses its output to pay the wage wtli,t, and the adjustment costs c(li,t, li,t−1).
When a firm with productivity zi,t and last-period labour li,t−1 employs li,t labour at
time t, it gets one-period profit:
pi(zi,t, li,t, li,t−1; wt) = f (zi,t, li,t)− wtli,t − wtc(li,t, li,t−1). (2.1)
The production technology is Cobb-Douglas with labour as the only input:
f (zi,t, li,t) = zi,tlαi,t, α ∈ (0, 1). (2.2)
The analysis focuses on the efficiency of labour allocation, so I neglect other produc-
tion factors. I assume a decreasing return to scale technology for the sake of keeping
the existence of low-productivity firms. In addition, the assumption is consistent
with empirical evidence. The estimate of the output elasticity of labor is smaller than
one. Each firm faces an idiosyncratic productivity shock in each period. The shock
follows an AR(1) process:
zi,t = z¯1−ρz
ρ
i,t−1ε i,t, ln ε i,t ∼i.i.d. N(0, σ2), ρ ∈ (0, 1). (2.3)
The range of ρ makes the process stable. Then, the joint distribution of productivity
and labour gets convergence. The assumption also makes the process mean reverting.
When the average productivity is smaller than z¯ at the initial stage, it will keep
increasing on the road of convergence. Furthermore, the assumption of the range
is consistent with empirical evidence. The estimate of ρ is in this range. Parameter
ρ also measures the persistency of idiosyncratic productivity. If ρ is closer to one,
the productivity shock is more persistent, and then, firms are more willing to adjust
labour to fit the productivity shocks.
Labour adjustment is costly. When firms adjust labour, they have to pay ad-
justment costs. The costs are proportional to wage. When wage is higher, labour
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adjustment cost is also higher. This study focuses on the consequence rather than
cause of frictions, so I use broadly defined adjustment costs to represent many type-
s of labour market frictions, such as hiring cost (Oi, 1962), firing cost (Hopenhayn
& Rogerson, 1993), and search friction (Cooper, Haltiwanger, & Willis, 2007). The
labour adjustment behaviour is diverse among Chinese firms. Cooper, Gong, and
Yan (2015; 2017) find many firms adjust their labour smoothly and continuously.
However, a large number of firms do not adjust labour. To fit the pattern, I use a rich
setup of adjustment costs in this study, following Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and
Bloom (2009). The costs contain three components. The first is the disposable fixed
cost, c01li,t 6=li,t−1 . Firms have to pay the cost when they hire/fire employees regardless
of the quantity of hiring/firing. When the fixed cost is high, the majority of firms
do not adjust labour, while a fraction of firms make a huge labour adjustment at one
period. The second component, c1|∆li,t|, is proportional to the gross firing/hiring.
For example, training costs are proportional to the number of new employees. Un-
employment compensations are proportional to the number of unemployed workers.
The proportional cost also can generate inaction like the fixed cost does. The third
component is the quadratic cost c2
(∆li,t)2
li,t+li,t−1 , which makes the sharp labour adjustment
costliers. If the quadratic costs are high, most firm will smoothly adjust their labour.
The total adjustment costs are the summation of the three components:
cad(li,t, li,t−1) = c01li,t 6=li,t−1 + c1|∆li,t|+ c2
(∆li,t)2
li,t + li,t−1
. (2.4)
Firing and hiring costs are assumed to be symmetric for the sake of reducing com-
putational complexity of the latter estimation.
Firms will exit the market when continued operation is unprofitable. They con-
sider the following Bellman equation for the decision of exit and labour adjustment,
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Vt(zi,t, li,t−1; w¯t) =max
li,t≥0
{pi(zi,t, li,t, li,t−1; wt)
+ βmax[EVt+1(zi,t+1, li,t; w¯t+1),−wtcad(0, li,t−1)− wtcex]},
(2.5)
where w¯t is the wages from period t to infinity. Firms make the exit decision at the
end of every period based on the comparison between the expected future value,
EV(zi,t+1, li,t; w¯t+1), and the exit cost, −wtcex, plus the cost for laying off all employ-
ees, −wtcad(0, li,t−1). If operation is costlier, a firm will fire all employees and exit the
market.
The decision of exit is determined by two costs, adjustment and exit costs. Ad-
justment costs influence exit decision in two ways. First, if adjustment costs do not
exist, firms with decreasing return to scale production technology will never exit the
market. When they are hit by a negative shock, they can make positive profit by
reducing labour. Adjustment frictions obstruct prompt labour adjustment, so gen-
erate the possibility of negative profit and exit. Second, adjustment costs also block
firm exit since firms have to consider firing costs when they plan to exit. Exit cost,
wtcex, measures the rest of the costs that firms have to pay when they exit the market
(e.g. loss in fire sales). Positive exit cost makes more firms stay in the market. It is
assumed to be proportional to wage. When wage is higher, exit cost is higher too.
Entering firms.– The economy also allows entry of new firms. New firms can be
created by paying an entry cost, cen. It is also assumed to be proportional to current
wage, wt. Potential entrants realise their productivity after paying the cost, so the
decision of entry is based on the expected value of a new firm. The value is equal to
the expected value of an incumbent with zero existing labour:
Vet = E
eVt(zi,t, 0; w¯t)− wtcen. (2.6)
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Figure 2.1: Time line of a firm
Firms can freely enter the market, so the value of entry is zero in equilibrium,
Vet = 0. (2.7)
The free entry condition determines the measure of entering firms.
Time line.– Figure 2.1 describes the time line of a firm. When the firm decides to
enter the market, it pays the entry cost at the beginning of the period. Then, the firm
realises its productivity, makes the employment decision, and produces goods. The
exit decision is made at the end of each period. If it choose to stay, the process will
restart from realise the productivity at the beginning of the next period.
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Distribution dynamics.– The firm distribution of firms updates every period until
reaching the new steady state. The law of motion is:
µt = Tt(µt−1) + νt, (2.8)
where µt be the joint distribution of labour and productivity at period t, νt is the
distribution of the new entrants at period t, and Tt is the transitional function of
incumbent firms which is solved from the Bellman equation (2.5).
Equilibrium.– This study analyses both the steady state and the transitional path.
Definition 1 defines the stationary equilibrium in the steady state.
Definition 1 A stationary equilibrium of the model is a wage system, which satisfies the
following conditions: (i) household optimisation; (ii) firm optimisation; (iii) labour market
clear; (iv) free entry Ve(w¯t) = 0; and (v) invariant distribution over time.
Definition 2 defines the recursive competitive equilibrium on the transitional path.
Definition 2 A recursive competitive equilibrium of the model is a wage system, which sat-
isfies the following conditions: (i) household optimization; (ii) firm optimization; (iii) labour
market clear; (iv) free entry Ve(w¯t) = 0; and (v) law of motion µt = Tt(µt−1) + νt.
When the free entry condition holds and the entry cost keeps constant in the tran-
sitional path, wage is always equal to the steady-state wage. The computation is
simplified because of the constant wage.
2.3 Growth decomposition
I decompose economic growth of the model economy to identify the quantitative
importance of efficiency improvement. I calculate the contribution of improving
allocative efficiency à la Hopenhayn (2014b). Furthermore, I decompose other growth
channels partially following Melitz and Polanec (2015).
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Five engines can drive economic growth in the model economy. Since the aggre-
gate labour supply is fixed, all the growth engines work on increasing the aggregate
productivity. The first is the productivity growth of the incumbent firms. This pa-
per studies labour productivity, so the productivity growth contains both technology
progress and capital accumulation. The second is the exit of the low-productivity
firms. The selection of exit firms will boost average productivity growth if these
firms are less productive than the survivors on average. The third component is the
entry of the high-productivity firms. The entry of new firms raises the aggregate pro-
ductivity if the entrants are, on average, more productive than incumbents. The forth
is the improvement of allocative efficiency. The aggregate productivity will increase
if resources are reallocated from the low-productivity firms to the high-productivity
firms. The fifth growth engine is expansion of the market size. When more firms pro-
duce in the market, the average size of these firms will be smaller. Then, marginal
productivity will be higher on average since the technology is decreasing return to
scale.
To set an efficient economy as the benchmark, I assume a social planner who can
reallocate resource without any costs. As the paper focuses on resource allocation
rather than market selection, the social plan takes productivity distribution and the
number of firms as given and only adjusts labour allocation. Given the productivity
distribution, the distance from the aggregate productivity in reality to the aggregate
productivity in the social planner economy measures the allocative inefficiency of the
economy. The social planner solves the following problem:
max
li,t
∑
i
zi,tlαi,t,
subject to
∑
i
li,t ≤ L.
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The social planner problem has an analytical solution. The maximised output is:
Y = (Ez˜i,t · Nt)1−α︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aopt
Lα, (2.9)
in which
z˜i,t ≡ z
1
1−α
i,t ,
and Nt is the number of firms at period t. A competitive equilibrium without any
frictions also can achieve this result. The allocative efficiency can be measured by a
relative productivity:
Arel,t ≡ Asim,tAopt,t , (2.10)
where Asim,t is the actual aggregate productivity of the simulated economy at the
same period. Then, the growth of aggregate productivity ∆ ln(Asim,t) can be decom-
posed by two components:
∆ ln(Asim,t) = ∆ ln(Arel,t) + ∆ ln(Aopt,t). (2.11)
The first component measures the contribution of improving allocative efficiency.
According to equation (2.9), Aopt,t can be further decomposed by two parts, Nt
and Ez˜i,t:
∆ ln(Asim,t) = ∆ ln(Arel,t) + (1− α)∆ ln(Nt) + (1− α)∆ ln(Ez˜i,t). (2.12)
The second term in equation (2.12) represents the size effect. Larger Nt indicates
smaller average size and higher marginal productivity on average. The last term
in equation (2.12) measures the productivity effect. It could increase in three ways:
productivity growth of the incumbent firms, exit of the low-productivity firms, and
entry of the high-productivity firms. Equation (2.13) decomposes the three channels:
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∆ ln(Asim,t) = ∆ ln(Arel)︸ ︷︷ ︸
allocative e f f iciency
+ (1− α)∆ ln(Nt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
size e f f ect
+ (1− α)∆ ln(Es z˜i,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
technology progress
+ (1− α) ln(Es z˜i,t−1/Ez˜i,t−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
market selection
+ (1− α) ln(Ez˜i,t/Es z˜i,t−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
f irm entry
.
(2.13)
The last term does not include all impacts of firm entry. This channel boosts growth
only if the productivity of the entering firms are higher than the productivity of
incumbent firms. Firm entry also increase aggregate productivity by increasing the
market size. This impact is in the second component. For the same reason, the forth
term of equation (2.13) is also not the full impact of exit.
2.4 Estimation
The target of the estimation is fitting the dynamic pattern of Chinese manufacturing
firms. I estimate the parameter values in three stages for the sake of robustness and
computational simplicity. First, I predetermine some parameters directly from values
in the data. Second, I estimate the firm-level productivity using Olley and Pakes’
(1996) method and the productivity dynamics using regression. Third, I estimate the
adjustment costs by SMM.
2.4.1 Data
The estimation targets the pattern of firm dynamics in reality. The data are from
the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database, an annual survey of Chinese industrial
firms. It is an imbalanced panel data containing all public firms and private firms
which annual sales larger than five million RMB. The data are frequently used in
the analysis of productivity and resource allocation (e.g. Hsieh & Klenow, 2009;
Song, Storesletten, & Zilibotti, 2011). I select only manufacturing firms to ensure
homogeneity of firms. The model is not designed for business cycles, so I select the
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Table 2.1: Data descriptives
Labour Output (million RMB)
Year Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Observations
2000 241.65 295.80 7.12 12.11 125894
2001 211.56 266.51 7.03 12.14 140125
2002 204.73 257.73 7.54 13.00 148694
2003 198.76 249.85 8.70 15.18 167238
2004 171.19 232.02 NA NA 245765
2005 173.50 215.06 11.70 20.58 230898
2006 164.59 204.28 13.91 24.51 257143
2007 158.21 196.33 16.65 28.86 290160
period from 2000 to 2007 to avoid influences from the Asian Financial Crisis and
Global Financial Crisis. The data in 2000 are the baseline of the estimation. The data
processing mainly follows Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2014).
Table 2.1 displays the data by years. The number of firms keeps increasing
throughout the whole period. This increases faster than labour supply, so the av-
erage size of firms keeps decreasing. However, the lower average input (labour) does
not block output growth, rather average output increases to more than double the
original value during the data periods. This indicates massive productivity growth
in the economy. The simulations in the next section will attempt to fit these patterns.
2.4.2 Predetermined parameters
Other parameters determined before estimation are shown in Table 2.2. All the values
are straightforwardly from the real data. The discounting factor β is chosen to match
the average annual interest rate from 2000 to 2007. Other values are based on the data
in 2007, the baseline year of the simulation (the most recent year before the Global
Financial Crisis). The labour supply L is the total employees of all firms. The initial
distribution µ0 is the real distribution of the 2007 data.
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Table 2.2: Value assignment of parameters
Parameter Explanation Value Target
Predetermined parameters
β Discounting factor 0.96 Annual interest rate
L Labour supply (million) 45.91 Total labour supply in 2007
µ0 Initial distribution NaN Real distribution in 2007
Idiosyncratic productivity estimated by Olley and Pakes’ (1996) method
α Output elasticity of labor 0.64 Chinese firm-level panel data,
ln(z¯) AR(1) constant 17.17 from 2000 to 2007
ρ AR(1) coefficient 0.78
σ stand deviation of AR(1) shock 2.03
Frictions estimated by SMM (proportion of baseline annual wage)
c0 Fixed adjustment costs 0.21 Moments of Chinese firm-level data
c1 Proportional adjustment cost 0.29 See table 2.3
c2 Quadratic adjustment costs 1.81
cex Exit cost 163.58
cen Entry cost 385.45
2.4.3 Productivity: Olley and Pakes’ (1996) method
I estimate the firm-level productivity, zi,t, using Olley and Pakes’ (1996) approach,
and then, run a regression on the firm-level panel data to get the parameters of the
stochastic process of technological progress. The results are shown in Table 2.2.
The literature highlights the endogeneity problem of productivity estimation, that
input level is correlated with unobserved productivity shocks. Olley and Pakes (1996)
introduced investment as a proxy of unobserved shocks and develop a consistent
semiparametric estimator. This study uses this approach to estimate labour produc-
tivity. When adjustment costs exist, labour is no longer a freely variable input. Thus,
labour is treated the same as capital in the original version. Based on the same argu-
ment Olley and Pakes (1996) made on investment, I use the change of employment
as a proxy of unobserved productivity shocks. I control for other production fac-
tors in the productivity regression. Theoretically this allows a consistent estimator
of the output elasticity of labour αˆ. As shown in Table 2.2, the estimate is close to
the labour income share and most estimates in the literature. The productivity is
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calculated from output, labour, and estimated output elasticity of labour:
Aˆi,t = (yi,t · L−αˆi,t )
1
1−αˆ .
The productivity shocks are independent and identically distributed as assumed
in equation (2.3), so the AR(1) process can be estimated simply by a regression on
the lagged productivity. The results are shown in the Table 2.2.
2.4.4 Frictions: Simulated method of moments
Since the model does not have an analytical form solution, I estimate adjustment
costs, entry cost, and exit cost by SMM, a simulation-based estimation. The main idea
is selecting parameters to minimise the weighted distance between the moments of
simulated data and real data (McFadden 1989, Pakes & Pollard 1989). The estimator
is solved from the following minimisation problem:
θˆ = arg min
θ∈Θ
[Mreal −Msim(θ)]′W[Mreal −Msim(θ)].
where θ is the set of parameters, Msim(θ) is the moments of the simulation with
parameter θ, Mreal is the moments of the data, W is the optimal weight matrix Lee
and Ingram (1991) provided. Under the null hypothesis, the real data and simulated
data are independent and from the same data generation process. Based on this
condition, Lee and Ingram (1991) proved that the efficient weight matrix is a function
of the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of [Mreal − Msim(θ)]. The variance-
covariance matrix is estimated by bootstrap method.
As shown in Table 2.3, seven target moments are chosen for the five parameters.
All the moments describe labour adjustment and exit/entry of firms. They do not di-
rectly target the relationship between labour and output, that is, they do not directly
target productivity. This is to avoid overfitting. The first moment is the proportion
of firms that do not adjust labour. For the sake of consistency and for robustness, I
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ignore the small labour adjustments within the grids set in the simulations. Hence,
the data moment here is larger than the value of the real data. The second moment is
the first-order autocorrelation of labour adjustment. The third is the same autocorre-
lation across the firms with non-zero labour adjustment. The two moments measure
firms’ intertemporal decision on labour adjustment. The fourth moment is the aver-
age ratio of labour adjustment to existing labour. The fifth is the same ratio across
the firms with non-zero labour adjustment. If the non-convex adjustment costs are
high, the second and third moments would be low, while the fourth and fifth would
be high. If the convex (quadratic) adjustment cost are high, the second and third
would be high, while the fourth and fifth would be low. The last two moments are
the average exit and entry rates across the simulation periods. The two describe firm
entry and market selection.
The simulation process is as follows. The real distribution of 2000 data is taken
as the initial distribution of labour and productivity, and then, firm dynamics are
simulated based on the model and given parameters. The first eight periods of the
simulations are taken to calculate the moments. In this way, the simulated moments
can match the moments of real data from 2000 to 2007.
Table 2.3 reports the data moments and simulated moments. Among the seven
moments, five fit data well that are the proportion of firms that do not adjust labour,
the first-order autocorrelation of the ratio of employment to labour stock (all the firms
and adjusting firms only), entry and exit rate. On the other hand, two moments do
not fit data very well that are the average ratio of labor adjustment (all the firms and
adjusting firms only). The two simulated values are nearly a half of the real values.
As I use five variables to match seven moments, it is understandable to get five good
matches only. The estimates are shown in Table 2.2. The parameter of the quadratic
term is the largest among the three components of adjustment costs. The impact
of this component is also large in the later quantitative analysis. The parameter of
the fixed adjustment cost is the smallest. In other words, proportional component
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Table 2.3: Simulated and data moments
Moments Data Simulated
Pr(∆lt = 0) 0.28 0.28
corr(∆lt/lt−1,∆lt−1/lt−2) -0.00 0.03
corr(∆lt/lt−1,∆lt−1/lt−2)∆lt,∆lt−1 6=0 -0.00 0.05
mean(|∆lt|/lt−1) 0.26 0.13
mean(|∆lt|/lt−1)∆lt 6=0 0.37 0.18
exit rate 0.14 0.14
entry rate 0.22 0.25
dominates the non-convex adjustment costs. Entry and exit costs are much higher
than adjustment costs. They are compared to the future value of a firm, so have to
be large enough to generate impact.
2.5 Reallocation dynamics
I simulate the firm dynamics after 2007. The simulation does generate a temporary
high-speed growth, mainly because of the efficiency improvement.
2.5.1 Distorted labour reallocation
Figure 2.2 plots the labour adjustment decision of firms in the simulated economy.
The horizontal axis is the productivity labour ratio zi,tli,t−1 , which measures the im-
balance between productivity and labour. Higher zi,tli,t−1 indicates higher demand of
labour. The vertical axis is the labour adjustment ratio, li,t−li,t−1li,t+li,t−1 . (li,t + li,t−1) is used
as the denominator rather than li,t−1 or li,t as the latter two can be zero. Both ratios
are rescaled by a concavification transformation, x˜ = ln(x + 1).
The pattern of labour adjustment is clear, while not smooth enough because of
the numerical error. First, the relationship between the two ratios is positive. A firm
is more likely to hire more labourers when its productivity is higher among same
size firms, and vice versa. Second, the relationship is nonlinear. Compared with
a middle-scale imbalance between productivity and labour, large scale imbalance
will not generate same scale labour adjustment. This is driven by the quadratic
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Figure 2.2: Policy function for labour adjustment.
Notes: The horizontal axis is the productivity labour ratio, zi,tli,t−1 . The vertical axis is the
labour adjustment ratio, li,t−li,t−1li,t+li,t−1 . Both ratios are rescaled by a concavification
transformation x˜ = ln(x + 1).
adjustment cost, which punishes large scale hiring/firing. Third, the middle segment
of the curve is flat. Firms adjust labour only if the productivity shock exceeds a
threshold. Although the inaction region is not large, the impact can be big. In the
benchmark economy, 25.39% of firms do not adjust their labour. This is because the
idiosyncratic shock ε concentrates around one, so most shocks are small. The inaction
region is driven by both proportional and fixed adjustment costs, but mainly from the
proportional component. If the disposable fixed component dominates the decision,
firms would hire/fire a lot once they exceed the threshold of action since they want
to divide the fixed cost. However, the graph is continuous around the thresholds. It
is consistent with the small fixed cost in the former estimation.
The decision rules indicate labour hoarding behaviour. If the negative shock is
not large enough, firms trend to hoard labour to avoid adjustment costs. Even if
the economy faces an aggregate negative shock, the unemployment rate might not
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Figure 2.3: Dynamics of the number of firms.
increase sharply, such as what happened in Germany after the Global Financial Crisis
(Burda & Hunt, 2011).
2.5.2 Reallocation dynamics
The simulation captures basic features of firm dynamics in the real data, although
that is not the main target of the analysis. Figure 2.3 shows the dynamics of the
number of firms. The market size keeps growing in the simulation at the early stage.
There are large inflows and outflows in the market, but firm entry dominates the
change of market size. The pattern is the same as in the real data shown in Table
2.1. Then, the increasing trend slows down. Finally, the market size starts to become
stable.
Labour reallocation is summarised in Figure 2.4. At the beginning, a lot of firms
enter the market. Most of these firms are small businesses since they cannot grow
up soon with adjustment frictions. The large entry pulls down the size distribution,
and makes the average firm size decreases as the pattern of the real data. However,
after the market size becames stable, labour slowly moves from large firms to small
but more productive firms. Finally, the labour allocation converges to a stationary
distribution after many years.
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Figure 2.4: Dynamics of the size of firms.
The firm dynamics generates a short period high-speed growth, as shown in
Figure 2.5. The sharply increasing productivity drives the same level output growth,
since labour supply is constant in the economy. The increasing trend in the early
periods is consistent with the real data. For the future, the model predicts the end of
the growth miracle when the economy reaches the steady state.
2.5.3 Growth decomposition
The model generates a temporary high-speed growth. Now I decompose the mirac-
ulous growth and identify the contribution of efficiency improvement. Following
equation (2.13), the productivity growth is decomposed by five components: (i) im-
proving allocative efficiency, (ii) increasing market size, (iii) technological growth of
incumbent firms, (iv) entry of high-productivity firms, and (v) exit of low-productivity
firms. Figure 2.6 shows the result of the decomposition during the periods of miracu-
lous growth. The allocative efficiency plays the most important role at the beginning
of miraculous growth. Then, its absolute contribution decreases along with the de-
creasing growth rate of aggregate productivity, but its relative contribution remains
high. This is supportive to the hypothesis of efficiency-driven miraculous growth and
consistent with some previous studies (e.g. Song et al., 2011). The increasing market
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Figure 2.5: Dynamics of aggregate productivity.
size makes the second largest contribution of productivity growth. Furthermore, its
relative contribution becomes more important in the later periods. However, its con-
tribution is still lower than the contribution of efficiency improvement on average.
2.6 The role of frictions
Frictions are crucial in the model. Without any frictions, the economy will always
stay with the first-best resource allocation. The transitional will be much faster than
in the real data. In this section, I analyse the impact of adjustment frictions. I simulate
economies with different levels of frictions from the same initial distribution, and
compare the simulations. I consider four levels of adjustment costs: cost-free, half of
the benchmark costs, the benchmark costs, and double of the benchmark costs. The
analysis focuses on the impact on the new steady state and the convergence speed.
Table 2.4 summarises the simulations on the new steady state. In these experi-
ments, higher frictions lower the aggregate productivity in the future steady state.
The impact is from both allocative efficiency, Asim/Aopt, and optimal productivity,
Aopt.
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Figure 2.6: Growth decomposition during the periods of miraculous growth.
Table 2.4: Counterfactual experiments on adjustment frictions
Adjustment frictions
None Half Benchmark Double
Aggregate productivity (Asim, 105) 3.97 2.78 1.89 1.10
Optimal productivity (Aopt, 105) 3.97 3.36 2.61 1.83
Average productivity (109) 3.01 1.94 1.94 1.99
Number of firms (million) 1.46 1.41 0.70 0.25
Allocative efficiency (Asim/Aopt, %) 99.99 82.60 72.20 60.03
Incumbent firms with hiring (%) 32.80 17.92 16.17 13.95
Incumbent firms with firing (%) 46.37 34.76 32.44 20.39
Incumbent firms with fixed labour (%) 12.13 47.18 50.89 64.59
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Resource allocation is closer to the first-best distribution when adjustment costs
are lower. In the scenario of cost-free (no adjustment costs), firms can adjust their
labour to the optimal level directly. As a result, the simulated productivity should
(theoretically) equal the optimal productivity. However, in Table 2.4, Asim/Aopt is
99.99% rather than 100%. This is because the labour choice is restricted on the grid
points rather than the whole state space. When labour adjustment frictions increase,
more and more firms choose to hoard their labour rather than fitting the shocks. The
allocative efficiency decreases in the stickier labour market. The impact of allocative
efficiency is bounded. It achieves its maximum in the cost-free economy, as shown in
column 1 of Table 2.4. It reaches its minimum when the costs are too high to adjust
any labour for all the firms. In this scenario, even higher adjustment costs cannot
distort the market any more.
Adjustment costs also reduce the optimal productivity Aopt. It lowers the average
productivity through two channels. First, it distorts entry and exit. This channel
dominates the impact on Aopt when the frictions are low. Second, adjustment fric-
tions reduce the number of firms in the market. This channel dominates the impact
on Aopt when the adjustment frictions are high.
Adjustment frictions do not only lower the steady state productivity, but also the
convergence speed. Figure 2.7 compares the dynamics of aggregate productivity in
the markets with different levels of adjustment frictions. All the economies show the
same pattern. The aggregate productivity grows up fast at beginning, and then, con-
verges to a higher value. The different levels of frictions lead to the different levels of
aggregate productivity in the steady states and the different speeds of convergence.
Convergence speed falls when the frictions are higher.
The different dynamic patterns are from both allocative efficiency, Asim/Aopt, and
optimal productivity, Aopt. Figure 2.8 shows the impact on the dynamics of alloca-
tive efficiency. In the friction-free economy, firm distribution directly goes to the
optimal level, Asim/Aopt, is close to one from the first period of the simulation. Ad-
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Figure 2.7: Counterfactuals on the dynamics of aggregate productivity with different
levels of adjustment frictions.
justment costs delay the efficiency improvement. The convergence is slower when
the adjustment costs are higher. In the scenario of double of the benchmark value,
the convergence is much slower than in the other three simulations.
Optimal productivity is also influenced by the adjustment frictions, but the influ-
ence is not as sharp as in allocative efficiency. Figure 2.9 shows the impact. Optimal
productivity grows more slowly when adjustment costs are higher. In the scenario
of highest adjustment costs, the dynamics do not show a convergence pattern until
the end of the same simulation periods.
2.7 Conclusion
The chapter builds a link between efficiency improvement and growth miracles. I
create, present, and analyse a heterogenous-firm model with adjustment frictions
and entry/exit barriers. The model can generate a short period of high-speed growth.
Efficiency improvement is found to play the most important role in growth during
the miracle period.
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Figure 2.8: Counterfactuals on the dynamics of allocative efficiency with different
levels of adjustment frictions.
Figure 2.9: Counterfactuals on the dynamics of optimal productivity with different
levels of adjustment frictions.
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Chapter 3
Technological diffusion,
productivity dispersion, and
so-called allocative inefficiency
3.1 Introduction
Literature has found massive productivity dispersion across firms in emerging e-
conomies (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, & Scarpetta, 2013; Hsieh & Klenow, 2009) but
has not found primary cause yet (Restuccia & Rogerson, 2017). Some emphasise
the role of frictions (Banerjee & Duflo, 2005; Jones, 2016), while others highlight
the nature of the economies (Asker, Collard-Wexler, & De Loecker, 2014; David,
Hopenhayn, & Venkateswaran, 2016). This paper links the two lines and suggests
that technological catch-up would boost productivity dispersion and exaggerate the
friction-driven misallocation of resource in emerging economies. The cross-country
differences of dispersions may represent different stages of development.
I study an emerging economy with technological diffusion and constant adjust-
ment costs. In the economy, firms learn about new technology from the world fron-
tier. Their learning speeds differ. In the transition, fast learners catch up to the
frontier very quickly while slow learners remain close to their original low technol-
ogy. The dispersion of productivity increase. Then, slower learners also move closer
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the frontier after a long period of learning. The distribution of productivity slowly
narrows until it finally reaches the stationary distribution. Furthermore, firms face
adjustment costs and delay labour adjustment as a response. Hence, the marginal
productivity of labour comoves with the productivity dynamics. The movement of
its dispersion is U-shaped too. Since adjustment costs remain constant over time, the
dispersion dynamics represent only the stages of development.
The U-shaped pattern relies on two key assumptions. First, firms improve pro-
ductivity by learning from the frontier. Many studies found that this is the major
engine of productivity progress in emerging economies (See the evidence in the next
session). Existing models (e.g. Acemoglu, Aghion, & Zilibotti, 2006) typically assume
a common probability of technological adoption. This paper, by contrast, assumes
firm-specific learning abilities, which gives extra flexibility. This assumption is con-
sistent with the estimate from firm-level data. Second, adjustment costs exist in factor
markets. This is another stylised fact which has been supported by the empirical ev-
idence from many markets. This paper focuses on Chinese labour market. In this
context, Cooper, Gong, and Yan (2015; 2017) find significant adjustment costs as well.
To formalise the above mechanism, I extend Hopenhayn and Rogerson’s (1993)
model and assume technical progress is the only source of growth. Then, the dynam-
ics of resource allocation becomes a consequence of economic growth. The model
economy is populated by heterogeneous entrepreneurs and homogenous labourers.
Each entrepreneur runs an enterprise and hires labourers as the only production
factor. Enterprises learn new technology from the frontier while how much they
can learn is the different realisations of a random process. To fit new technology
and productivity, they adjust labour and pay adjustment costs. For the sake of data
fitness, the costs are assumed to be a combination of both convex and non-convex
components. The firm-specific learning speeds generate more dispersed produc-
tivity distribution during catch-up process. The learning and adjustment frictions
together make the distribution of marginal productivity broader as well. The two
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distributions comove and the dynamics of dispersions both show U-shaped pattern.
Furthermore, technological catch-up also introduces a persistent uncertainty shock
on future productivity, so the dispersion of marginal productivity raises sharply in
the beginning.
The estimation of parameter values targets Chinese manufacturing firms. For the
sake of robustness and computational simplicity, the estimations are separated by
four steps. First, some parameters are predetermined based on real data. Second,
firm-level productivity is estimated by the Olley and Pakes’ (1996) approach. Third,
given idiosyncratic productivity, the deeper parameters of learning process are esti-
mated by maximizing likelihood. Fourth, since the model does not have analytical
form solution, the parameters of adjustment costs are estimated by simulated method
of moments.
I start the analysis with a thought experiment of firm dynamics and catch-up. I
simulate an emerging economy that initially stays in a steady state with lower tech-
nology level, and then, starts to catch up the world frontier. In this simulation, the
dynamics of productivity dispersion and so-called allocative inefficiency are both U-
shaped. The new technology brings high dispersions and inefficiency at first, and
then, slowly reduces dispersions and boosts efficiency. Since technological change is
the only source of growth, the relationship suggests causality; that is, the U-shaped
movements are a byproduct of technical progress. As discussed previously, the U-
shapes are driven by both technological diffusion and adjustment frictions. In both
the low-tech and high-tech steady states, firms’ productivity levels are close to each
other so resource allocation is less important. However, during the transition, pro-
ductivity highly differs across firms due to different learning speeds. The larger
dispersion makes resource allocation more important in the middle part of the tran-
sition.
Then, I simulate the transitional dynamics of future China. The simulation sug-
gests that the economy was already on the upwards part of the U-shaped pattern.
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The economy will converge to a more efficient allocation even without reducing fric-
tions. The magnitude of dispersion reduction and efficiency gain are substantially
high when compared to the literature on misallocation and frictions (Restuccia &
Rogerson, 2017). The result indicates that the differences of productivity dispersions
between emerging and developed economies are not only due to the different levels
of distortions, but also largely due to the different stages of development. Further-
more, economic development itself can be a solution of resource misallocation.
The level of frictions is still important in the simulation, but the importance de-
pends on the stage of development. Frictions are more influential in the middle part
of the transition. Whether the level of frictions are high or low, the low-tech and high-
tech steady states are always efficient but the transitional paths are different. Higher
frictions generate the higher dispersion of marginal productivity during transitional
dynamics. By contrast, lower frictions lead to smoother transition.
I make three specific contributions in this paper: First, this study links alloca-
tive efficiency to the stage of development and suggests that resource allocation is
naturally more inefficient in emerging economies. Quantitatively, this channel can
explain a large proportion of cross-country efficiency differences. The analysis fol-
lows the efforts by Asker et al. (2014), Buera and Shin (2013) and Moll (2014), and
highlights dynamic rather than static resource allocation. Second, this study suggests
that economic growth itself can solve the problem of resource misallocation. When
an economy converges to steady state, the allocation of production factors can return
to a more efficient level even without the reduction of frictions. Third, this model can
capture the firm dynamics in emerging economies, particularly consistent and large
firm entry and exit. I model the economy by the transitional dynamics of a canonical
model. The simulation shows the similar pattern as in the real data.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I illustrate
the motivating facts. In section 3, I build a theoretical model for the later analysis.
In section 4, I describe the estimation of parameters. In section 5, I simulate the
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model economy and show the relationship between technical progress and allocative
efficiency. Finally, I conclude in section 6.
3.2 Motivating facts
In this section, I demonstrate the motivating facts of the study. I firstly provide the
evidence of the link between the stages of development and allocative efficiency, and
then, discuss the literature on technology diffusion and resource allocation.
Economic development and productivity dispersion – To the author’s knowledge, due to
data availability, the analysis of the firm dynamics during whole catch-up process is
still missing. Instead, I will provide some suggestive evidences that can indicate the
importance of the stage of development.
In general, productivity dispersions tend to be similar in economies that are in a
similar stage of development. As an example, Ziebarth (2013) found that the level of
productivity dispersion in the 19th century U.S. is very close to that in contemporary
China and India. What is similar about the three economies is their stages of devel-
opment not institutions or policies. Particularly, it is a stylised fact that productivity
distribution is more dispersed in emerging economies than in developed economies
(Bartelsman et al., 2013; Hsieh & Klenow, 2009). In addition, productivity dispersion
also can be low in less-developed economies when they are in steady state. Brown,
Dinlersoz, and Earle (2016) found that after East European upheaval and Soviet dis-
organization, the level of dispersion became higher in Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania,
Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. This finding also suggests that the level of distor-
tions is not the whole story of resource misallocation, as market distortions were
diminished in these markets in that era. To sum up, empirical evidence suggests
that productivity dispersion is higher in transitional economies than in steady-state
economies.
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Technology diffusion and resource allocation – In this model, I assume that economic
growth is triggered by international technology adoption. This type of growth has
been found in nearly all the economies (Comin & Hobija, 2010; Eaton & Kortum,
1999; Fagerberg, 1994; Keller, 2004). Particularly, it is more important in emerging
economies, as they are far from the world technological frontier (Acemoglu et al.,
2006; Howitt, 2000).
When the new technologies arrive an economy, firms never embrace them imme-
diately. They keep investing in old technology for decades, and then slowly reallocate
resources to new technology. At the industry level, this phenomenon happened when
tractors went into American agriculture (Olmstead & Rhode, 2001) and when steam
engines went into British industry (Crafts, 2004; Crafts & Mills, 2004). At the country
level, it happened in the first industrial revolution in Britain (see the case study of
the steam engine), and in the second (Atkeson & Kehoe, 2007) and third industrial
revolutions (Greenwood & Yorukoglu, 1997; Gordon, 2012) in America. This study is
a natural extension of this line of literature in the cross-country context.
3.3 Model
Based on the discussion above, I build a model of heterogeneous firms with inter-
national technology diffusion and adjustment friction. The analytical framework is
extended from Hopenhayn and Rogerson’s (1993) model.
Agents – The economy is composed of two kinds of agents, a measure Mt of en-
trepreneurs and a measure Lt of labourers. Both grow at the same constant growth
rate gl > 1. 1 I simplify their behaviour by the following three assumptions. First,
labourers cannot get utility from leisure, thus, the labour supply is perfectly inelas-
1Population growth does not influence any agent in the economy and will not boost the growth
of per capita output. I make this assumption for the sake of data fitness. Because of baby boom and
rural-urban migration, labour force increase dramatically in the data period. The number of firms also
substantially increases. This change can be easily captured by this assumption. This is substantial to
validate the latter quantitative results.
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tic. Second, entrepreneurs are risk neutral, so their utility maximization problem is
equivalent to the output maximization problem. Third, the economy only produces
a nondurable good, so households have to consume all the products at the end of
each period. In other words, no intertemporal transfer exists in the economy.
Time line – Figure 3.1 describes the life cycle of an entrepreneur. An entrepreneur can
only manage one firm in each period. When he/she launches a firm, he/she draws
productivity from the stationary distribution, and then decides whether to exit the
market or not. If the entrepreneur decides to stay (with probability 1 in the first
period), he/she adjusts employment, and then produces goods. In the next period,
the entrepreneur draws a new productivity zi,t based on the existing productivity
zi,t−1, and repeats the cycle. The firm keeps working until the entrepreneur reaches
a too low productivity zi,t < z∗t (li,t−1). Then, he/she closes the firm, and organizes a
new one in the next period.
Technology – A firm is characterized by its productivity zi,t and last-period employees
li,t−1. Using labour li,t as the only input it produces final good, and using the output
it pays wages wtli,t, and adjustment costs c(li,t, li,t−1). I neglect other production
factors, so the analysis can focus on resource allocation of one factor. When a firm
with productivity zi,t and existing employees li,t−1 employs li,t labour at time t, it gets
one-period profit,
pi(zi,t, li,t, li,t−1; wt) = f (zi,t, li,t)− wtli,t − c(li,t, li,t−1). (3.1)
Firms’ production functions are in Cobb-Douglas form with the same labour supply
elasticity α,
f (zi,t, li,t) = zi,tlαi,t, α ∈ (0, 1). (3.2)
I assume that the production functions are decreasing returns to scale. Theoretically,
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Figure 3.1: Life cycle of an entrepreneur
the assumption keeps the existence of heterogeneity. Empirically, the assumption is
consistent with real data in the later quantitative analysis.
The productivity follows a random coefficient autoregressive process,
ln zi,t = ln zi,t−1 + (ln z f ,t − ln zi,t−1)ei,t − ηi,t. (3.3)
where
z f ,t = z f ,0gtz, zi,0 ∈ (0, z f ,0],
ei,t ∼i.i.d. B(e1, e2), ηi,t ∼i.i.d. Γ(e3, e4).
(3.4)
A firm improves productivity by learning from the world frontier z f ,t. I ignore re-
search and development. The reason is that most technology progress is from learn-
ing (Comin & Hobija, 2010; Eaton & Kortum, 1999; Fagerberg, 1994; Keller, 2004).
This is valid particularly in developing economies, since they are far from the fron-
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tier. The frontier grows from the initial level z f ,0 with a constant rate gz ≥ 1. How
much a firm can narrow the distance to the frontier (ln z f ,t − ln zi,t−1) is a random
variable ei,t ∈ [0, 1]. An independent shock ηi,t covers the rest of variation in techni-
cal progress. I choose beta and gamma distribution to reduce the restriction on the
shape of the distributions. The progress is tight, zi,t ∈ (0, z f ,t]. Define the operator ˜
by
x˜t ≡ g−tz xt.
Then, z˜i,t follows a stationary process,
ln z˜i,t = ln
z˜i,t−1
gz
· (1− ei,t) + ln z f ,0 · ei,t − ηi,t, (3.5)
Adjustment frictions – Labour adjustment is costly. When a firm wants to adjust labour
as a response to a productivity shock, it has to pay adjustment costs. The study focus-
es on the consequences rather than cause of friction, so I use broad adjustment costs
rather than open the black box of deeper mechanisms. The costs can include hiring
cost (Oi, 1962), firing cost (Hopenhayn & Rogerson, 1993), and search friction (Coop-
er, Haltiwanger, & Willis, 2007). Labour adjustment behaviour is diverse in reality.
For example, in Chinese firm-level data, many firms adjust their labour smoothly
and continuously, but also a significant amount of firms do not adjust labour in a
particular year (Cooper et al., 2015; 2017). To fit the pattern, I use a rich setup of ad-
justment costs following Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), Bloom (2009). Three kinds
of adjustment costs are considered. The first component is the disposable fixed cost
c01li,t 6=li,t−1 . Firms have to pay the cost when they hire/fire employees regardless of
the quantity of adjustment. When fixed cost are high, the majority of firms do not
adjust labour, and a small fraction of firms make a huge labour adjustment in one
period. The second component c1|∆li,t| is proportional to the gross firing/hiring. For
example, training costs are proportional to the number of new employees, and unem-
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ployment compensation is proportional to the number of unemployed workers. The
proportional cost also can generate an inaction region like the fixed cost. The third
component is the quadratic cost c2
(∆li,t)2
li,t+li,t−1 , which makes sharp labour adjustments
more costly. If the quadratic costs are high, most firms will smoothly change their
labour. The total adjustment cost is the summation of the three costs,
c(li,t, li,t−1) = c01li,t 6=li,t−1 + c1|∆li,t|+ c2
(∆li,t)2
li,t + li,t−1
. (3.6)
I assume that firing and hiring costs are symmetric in the concern of computational
complexity in the later estimation.
Incumbent’s problem – An incumbent entrepreneur will adjust labour for the maximal
value. He/she will close a firm when keeping operating is not profitable. The in-
cumbents consider the following Bellman equation for labour adjustment and exit
decisions,
Vt(zi,t, li,t−1; w¯t) = max
1exit∈{0,1}
{(1− 1exit) ·max
li,t≥0
{pi(zi,t, li,t, li,t−1; wt) + βEVt+1(zi,t+1, li,t; w¯t+1)}
+ 1exit · [βEVt+1(zi,t+1, 0; w¯t+1)− c(0, li,t−1)]}.
(3.7)
where w¯t is the wage vector from period t to infinity.
A firm makes the exit decision once it realizes its productivity at the beginning of
each period. The decision is based on the comparison between the expected future
value, EVt+1(zi,t+1, li,t; w¯t+1), and the exit cost, −c(0, li,t−1), which is the layoff cost
for all employees when it exits. If operation is more expensive, they will clear all their
labour (li,t=0) and exit the market. Adjustment costs influence exit decisions in two
ways. On the one hand, if costs do not exist, a firm with a decreasing return to scale
production function will never leave the market. Even if it is hit by a huge negative
shock, it still can be profitable by reducing labour. Adjustment frictions obstruct
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prompt labour adjustment, and then generate the possibility of negative profit and
exit. On the other hand, adjustment costs are also barriers to exit decisions since exit
firms have to pay adjustment costs for firing all workers.
Given the existing employees li,t−1, there exists a threshold of productivity z∗t (li,t−1).
A firm will exit the market if it draws productivity zi,t < z∗t (li,t−1). Section 4 will pro-
vide a more detailed discussion on the threshold.
Entrant’s problem – At the very beginning of each period, newborn entrepreneurs en-
ter the market. The old entrepreneurs who exited in the last period also enter the
market again. The two groups are identical. Each firm draws a detrended produc-
tivity from the stationary distribution of z˜i,t (See equation (3.5)). Then, it solves the
Bellman equation (3.7) with zero existing labour (li,t−1 = 0). No one will exit the
market right after entry since z∗t (0) = 0.
Law of motion – The distribution of firms updates every period until it reaches a
new steady state. Define µt as the measure of the joint distribution of labour and
productivity. Then, the distribution in period t is
µt = Tt(µt−1) + νt, (3.8)
where Tt(·) is the transition function of the incumbent firms, which is determined by
the Bellman equation (3.7). νt is the distribution of new entering firms at period t,
which is determined by the initial draw and the Bellman equation.
Equilibrium – The study discusses both the steady state and the transitional path to
the steady state, so I define two kinds of equilibria. Definition 3 is used to calculate
the steady state.
Definition 3 A stationary equilibrium of the model is a wage system in steady state, which
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satisfies the following conditions: (i) labourer optimization; (ii) entrepreneur optimization;
(iii) labour market clear; (iv) invariant distribution over time.
Definition 4 describes the relative recursive competitive equilibrium used in the
computation of the transitional dynamics.
Definition 4 A recursive competitive equilibrium of the model is a wage system, which
satisfies the following conditions: (i) labourer optimization; (ii) entrepreneur optimization;
(iii) labour market clear; (iv) law of motion µt = Tt(µt−1) + νt.
Growth decomposition – Productivity is the only source of growth in the model, since
the total production input is fixed. Two channels contribute to productivity growth.
The first channel is the technical progress of the incumbent firms. The second channel
is the allocative efficiency. Reallocating more resources to high-productivity firms
raises the aggregate productivity. I decompose the two channels à la Hopenhayn
(2014b).
I assume a social planner who can reallocate resources without any costs. Giv-
en the productivity distribution, the distance between real productivity and social
optimal productivity measures the allocative efficiency of the economy. The social
optimal productivity is achieved in the competitive equilibrium without any friction.
It also can be solved as a social planner problem (Hopenhayn, 2014b),
max
li,t
∑
i
zi,tlαi,t,
subject to
∑
i
li,t ≤ Lt.
The social planner problem has an analytical solution, that the optimal output is
Y = (Ez
1
1−α
i,t · Nt)1−α︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aopt
Lαt , (3.9)
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where Nt is the number of firms at period t. The allocative efficiency can be measured
by the relative productivity,
Arel,t ≡ Asim,tAopt,t . (3.10)
The measure includes not only reallocation within the surviving firms, but also the
exiting and entering firms. Now the growth of simulated productivity ∆ ln(Asim,t)
can be decomposed by relative two components,
∆ ln(Asim,t) = ∆ ln(Arel,t) + ∆ ln(Aopt,t). (3.11)
3.4 Estimation
This section explains the estimation of the parameters. The estimation targets Chi-
nese manufacturing firms. I separately estimate three parts of the model for the
purpose of robustness and computational complexity. I estimate labour productivity
using the Olley and Pakes’ (1996) approach, estimate adjustment costs by simulated
method of moments (henceforth SMM), and calibrate other parameters directly from
data.
3.4.1 Data
The estimation is based on the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database, an annual
survey of Chinese industrial firms. The data preprocessing mainly follows Brandt,
Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2014). I include all manufacturing firms for the pur-
pose of consistency. The data are frequently used in the analysis of productivity and
resource allocation (e.g. Hsieh & Klenow, 2009; Song, Storesletten, & Zilibotti, 2011).
The imbalanced panel data include all state-owned enterprises and most non-state
firms with annual sales larger than five million RMB. I exclude observations with
missing values and outliers in key variables. Since my model cannot handle aggre-
gate shocks, I choose the period from 2000 to 2007 to avoid influences from the Asian
Financial Crisis and the Global Financial Crisis. Data from 1999 provide a baseline
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for estimation.
Table 3.1 describes the data, grouped by years. As shown in the table, the dis-
tribution of China’s manufacturing firms is not stationary during this period. Both
the first-order and first-order moments of the size distribution keeps changing. The
average size of firms keeps decreasing, although both the number of firms and the
total labour supply increase. The standard deviation of the size of firms keeps de-
creasing. On the other hand, the data also indicate massive productivity growth in
the economy, since the average output goes up although average input (labour) goes
down. The simulations in the next section will try to fit these patterns.
Table 3.1: Data descriptives
Labour Output (million RMB)
Year Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Observations
2000 241.65 295.80 7.12 12.11 125894
2001 211.56 266.51 7.03 12.14 140125
2002 204.73 257.73 7.54 13.00 148694
2003 198.76 249.85 8.70 15.18 167238
2004 171.19 232.02 NA NA 245765
2005 173.50 215.06 11.70 20.58 230898
2006 164.59 204.28 13.91 24.51 257143
2007 158.21 196.33 16.65 28.86 290160
3.4.2 Predetermined parameters
The top panel of Table 3.2 shows the calibration of the baseline parameters. The initial
distribution µ0 is taken from the real data in 2007, the last year before the Global
Financial Crisis. The initial labour supply L0 and initial number of entrepreneurs
are also taken from the same year data. The population growth rate gl is calibrated
by the average labour force growth rate in the data from 2000 to 2007. Lastly, the
discount factor β is calculated from the average annual interest rate from 2000 to
2007.
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Table 3.2: Value assignment of parameters
Para. Explanation Value Target
Baseline parameters
µ0 initial distribution NaN real distribution in 2007
L0 initial labour supply (m.) 45.91 total labour supply in 2007
M0 the ini. num. of entrepreneurs (m.) 0.29 num. of firms in 2007
gl the growth rate of population 1.06 avg. lab. force growth rate (00-07)
gz the growth rate of frontier 1.02 the prod. growth rate in the U. S.
β discount factor 0.96 annual interest rate
Productivity
α the output elasticity of labor 0.64 Chinese firm-level panel data
z˜ f ,0 technology frontier 8.41 the highest grid point in 2007
Learning process
e1 the 1st shape parameter of B dis. 1.17 the likelihood of firm panel
e2 the 2nd shape parameter of B dis. 10.08 the likelihood of firm panel
e3 the shape parameter of Γ dis. 0.93 the likelihood of firm panel
e4 the inverse scale parameter of Γ dis. 0.51 the likelihood of firm panel
Adjustment frictions (proportion of baseline annual wage)
c2 quadratic adjustment cost 4.60 the moments of labour adjustment
c1 proportional adjustment cost 2.20 (see table 3.3)
c0 fixed adjustment cost 0.82
3.4.3 Firm-level productivity: Olley and Pakes’ (1996) method
I estimate firm-level productivity zi,t à la Olley and Pakes (1996). The results are
shown in the upper middle panel of Table 3.2.
I use a semiparametric method to estimate the production function parameters
for consistency. The literature highlights the endogeneity problem of productivity es-
timation, that input levels are correlated with unobserved productivity shocks. Olley
and Pakes (1996) introduced investment as a proxy of unobserved shocks, and then,
develop a consistent estimator. This study uses the labour version of the Olley and
Pakes’ (1996) approach. Labour is no longer a freely variable input when adjustment
costs exist, so I can treat labour as the same as capital. Based on the same argument
as Olley and Pakes (1996) made, I use employment as the proxy of unobserved pro-
ductivity shocks. I also control for other production factors. Then, theoretically, I can
get a consistent estimator of the output elasticity of labour αˆ. As shown in Table 3.2,
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the estimate is near the labour income share and near most estimates in the literature.
The estimator of productivity is
zˆi,t = (yi,t · l−αˆi,t )
1
1−αˆ .
3.4.4 Learning process: maximum likelihood estimation
I estimate the learning process (3.3) (3.4) by maximum likelihood estimation. The
likelihood function is as follows,
ln L(e1, e2, e3, e4; ·) =∑
i
∑
t
ln[
∫ 1
0
fB(x; e1, e2) fΓ(ln zi,t−1 − ln zi,t
+ (ln z f ,t − ln zi,t−1)x; e3, e4)dx].
(3.12)
I pool all the data with previous year productivity. Firm entry and exit can drive
data selection issues, but modelling this part takes much more computational power,
so I ignore the issue to reduce computational complexity.
I assume some of Chinese manufacturing firms have already reached the world
technology frontier. In the estimation, I use the 99th percentile productivity in that
industry in that year as the frontier. I chose the 99th percentile rather than maximum
point to rule out the impact of outliers. In the simulations, I calibrate the baseline
frontier z f ,0 by the highest grid point in the baseline year. In the estimation, all the
frontiers are calibrated from the data, so the growth rate gz is not necessary. In
the simulations, I assume the frontier grows at the same rate as labour productivity
growth in the United States.
The estimates of e1, e2, e3, and e4 are shown in the lower middle panel of Table 3.2.
The distributions of ei,t and ηi,t are shown in Figure 3.2. Both variables are skewed
and closed to zero, this indicates that productivity is persistent across periods. The
value of the learning process ei,t is small; most firms cannot learn much from the
frontier, so the catch-up process is slow. The shape parameter of ηi,t is closed to 1,
so the Gamma distribution here is closed to exponential distribution, but the peak is
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slightly higher than zero. Section 4 provides a sensitivity test of the impact of these
parameters.
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(a) The pdf of ei,t, e1 = 0.13, e2 = 10.10.
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(b) The pdf of ηi,t, e3 = 1.07, e4 = 0.06.
Figure 3.2: The probability density functions of ei,t and ηi,t.
Notes: See Equation (3.3) and (3.4.
3.4.5 Adjustment frictions: simulated method of moments
I estimate adjustment costs by simulated method of moments, henceforth SMM, since
the analytical form solution does not exist in the model. The main idea of SMM
is selecting parameters to minimize the weighted distance between the moments of
simulated data and real data (McFadden, 1989; Pakes & Pollard, 1989). The estimator
is solved from the following minimization problem,
θˆ = arg min
θ∈Θ
[Mreal −Msim(θ)]′W[Mreal −Msim(θ)].
I use the optimal weight matrix which Lee and Ingram (1991) provide. Under the
estimating null, the real data and simulated data are independent and from the same
data generation process. Based on this condition, Lee and Ingram (1991) proved that
the efficient weight matrix is a function of the inverse of the variance-covariance ma-
trix of [Mreal −Msim(θ)]. I estimate the variance-covariance matrix by the bootstrap
method.
As shown in Table 3.3, five target moments are chosen for the five parameters.
If the estimation targets the relationship between labour and output, I might target
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Table 3.3: Simulated and data moments
Moments Data Simulated
Pr(∆li,t = 0) 0.28 0.28
corr(∆li,t/li,t−1,∆li,t−1/li,t−2) -0.00 0.00
corr(∆li,t/li,t−1,∆li,t−1/li,t−2)∆li,t,∆li,t−1 6=0 -0.00 0.00
mean(|∆li,t|/li,t−1) 0.26 0.22
mean(|∆li,t|/li,t−1)∆li,t 6=0 0.37 0.24
productivity directly. To avoid the possibility, I use five moments on labour market
and exit/entry only. The first is the proportion of firms which do not adjust the pre-
vious year’s labour. The number would be high if adjustment costs, in particular the
fixed disposable component, are high. The second is the first order autocorrelation
of labour adjustment, since adjustment costs mainly influence firms’ intertemporal
labour decisions. The third is the same autocorrelation across firms with labour ad-
justments. The fourth is the average ratio of labour adjustment to last year’s labour.
If the fixed adjustment cost is high, the third moment would be high. If the quadratic
component is high, the forth moment would be low. The fifth is the same ratio across
the firms with labour adjustment.
The simulation process for SMM is as follows. I take the 1999 real data as the ini-
tial distribution of labour and productivity, and then simulate the whole transitional
path of the economy. I use the first 8 periods to calculate the simulated moments, so
the periods are the same as in the data.
Table 3.3 reports the data moments and simulated moments. The simulated mo-
ments and data moments match well.
The bottom panel of Table 3.2 reports the estimates. The parameters values are
not very close to the values in Chapter 2. The difference comes from the different
model setups. The multiplier of quadratic adjustment cost is the largest among the
three components, and its effects are even larger in the later quantitative analysis.
Fixed adjustment costs are small which is related to the fact that only 27.88% of firms
fix their labour in the real data. For the purpose of consistency and for robustness,
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I ignore small labour adjustments within the grids in the former numerical work.
Entry and exit costs are higher because they are compared to the future value of the
firms rather than only one-period profit.
3.5 Results
In this section, I simulate the catch-up process based on estimates in the last section,
and check the relationship between technical progress and allocative inefficiency. I
will discuss some features of the model first, and then, simulate the convergence
path of an emerging economy. Lastly, I will simulate the firm dynamics of China
after 2007.
3.5.1 Technical progress and distorted labour adjustment
This subsection provides some discussion about the basic features of this model.
First, I discuss how the distributions of learning skills and the growth rate of frontier
influence the catch-up processes. Then, I show the relationship between distance
to frontier and volatility of productivity. Finally, I illustrate the distorted labour
adjustment.
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Figure 3.3: The stationary distribution of logarithmic productivity with different
learning skills ei,t(e1, e2).
Notes: Slow learning: e1 = 1.06, e2 = 11.09; benchmark learning: e1 = 1.17, e2 = 10.08; fast
learning: e1 = 1.29, e2 = 9.07.
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Figure 3.4: The stationary distribution of logarithmic productivity with different
growth rates of the frontier gz.
Notes: Slow growth: gz = 0.92; benchmark growth: gz = 1.02; fast growth: gz = 1.12.
Catch-up – Where the economy will catch up to is determined by three factors: the
learning skills ei,t(e1, e2), the growth rate of the frontier gz, and idiosyncratic shock
ηi,t(e3, e4). The first two relate to the learning process. Figure 3.3 shows the impacts of
the learning skills. I simulate the stationary distributions of productivity with three
learning distributions. When the learning process is faster (the learning distribution
is more right skewed), the stationary distribution is closer to the frontier. Figure 3.4
shows the impacts of the growth rate of the frontier. When the frontier grows faster,
the stationary distribution is further from the frontier.
Distance to frontier and uncertainty – The volatility of productivity is going down along
with the catch-up process. This is a key assumption of this model. This subsection
provides evidence to support the assumption. Equation (3.3) decomposes the volatil-
ity into two parts, ei,t and ηi,t. ei,t is related to distance to frontier. ηi,t catches the
rest. The variance of ei,t is 1.09e− 3. The variance of ηi,t is 3.98e− 3. The contribution
of ei,t depends on the distance to frontier. Figure 3.5 (a) shows the distribution of
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distance to frontier in the real data. I rule out the top 1% and the bottom 1% for
robustness. Figure 3.5 (b) shows the volatility decomposition in the same range. The
distance to frontier plays a significant role in the whole range. Based on equation
(3.3), the variance in productivity decreases when the technological gap is lower. It
contributes 49.36% of the variance in productivity even in the highest productivity
firms. The contribution is 70.58% in the lowest productivity firms. Uncertainty will
go down significantly in all these firms if they can catch up to the frontier. This result
is not sufficient to show the causality from technology to uncertainty, but at least the
relationship is consistent with my assumptions, and the magnitude is large enough.
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(a) The distribution of distance to frontier. (b) Decomposition of variance of productivity.
Figure 3.5: Distance to frontier and volatility of productivity.
Notes: The domain is from the 1st percentile −8.76 to the 99th percentile −3.56.
Distorted labour adjustment – Figure 3.6 plots the labour adjustment of a firm in the
new steady state. The pattern is clear, while it is not smooth enough according
to the computational accuracy. First, higher productivity indicates higher labour
adjustment in the same size firms, matching the increasing trend. Second, the trend
is not linear. Firms are more sensitive to smaller productivity shocks than larger
shocks, since quadratic adjustment costs punish large scale hiring/firing. Third, the
middle segment is flat. Firms adjust labour only if productivity shocks exceed a
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Figure 3.6: Policy function for labour adjustment.
Notes: The horizontal axis is the productivity to labour ratio zi,t/li,t−1. The vertical axis is
the labour adjustment ratio ∆li,tli,t+li,t−1 . Both the two ratios are rescaled by a concavification
transformation x˜ = ln(x + 1).
threshold.
3.5.2 From low-tech to high-tech
This subsection describe the firm dynamics during catch-up process by a thought
experiment. I assume that an economy starts from a steady state in which the tech-
nology frontier is half of the world frontier. Then, the economy opens the gate to the
world frontier, starting the catch-up process. The cross-country technology differ-
ence in the simulation is much smaller than in the real world, so it is a conservative
estimate of the magnitude of the impact.
Theoretically, the simulation studies the impact of a permanent shock to the tech-
nology frontier. According to equations (3.3) and (3.5), the shock at the frontier also
brings an uncertainty shock. Unlike the temporary shock discussed by Bloom (2009),
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Figure 3.7: Proximity to frontier and allocative efficiency, from the steady state with
a lower frontier.
the shock here is gradually decayed.
U-shaped curve – As shown in Figure 3.7, the movement of allocative efficiency is U-
shaped. The start of the catch-up process generates a dramatic efficiency reduction at
the beginning of the simulation. As discussed before, according to uncertainty and
adjustment frictions, the economy cannot immediately move resources to firms with
new technology. The uncertainty shock generates efficiency losses. Since technical
progress is gradual, the loss cannot be huge at the beginning, but keeps accumu-
lating. It takes several periods until reaching the bottom. Then, technical progress
reduces uncertainty gradually, and pushes up the efficiency. Along with the catch-up
process, allocative efficiency dramatically reduces at the beginning, and then gradu-
ally increases.
Distribution dynamics – Figure 3.8 shows the dynamics of productivity distribution
when an economy grows from poor to rich. I increase the initial technological gap to
show the pattern more clearly. The initial frontier here is half of the world frontier
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Figure 3.8: The dynamics of productivity distribution during the catch-up process,
from a steady state with a lower frontier.
Notes: The initial distribution is half of the world frontier in the logarithmic space, 12 ln z f ,t.
in the logarithmic space. The change happens in both the first order moment and
the second order moment. On the one hand, the mean of the distribution keeps
increasing during the catch-up process, so the uncertainty of the economy keeps
decreasing because of equation (3.3). This drives the U-shape as discussed in the
last subsection. On the other hand, the dynamics of variance follows an inverted
U-shape. The distribution is relatively narrow in both the lo-tech and hi-tech steady
state. This is because of different learning speeds across firms. Some lucky firms
learn fast, so they can reach the frontier quickly. Some unlucky firms learn slowly,
so they continue using old technology for a long time. Thus, the distribution spread
when they catch up to the new frontier. Eventually, everybody reaches relatively
high technology in the new steady state. This is another driving force of the U-shape.
Resource allocation is less important when productivity distribution is concentrated,
such as in two steady states in the economy. However, when some firms are much
more productive than others, it is more important that they have enough production
factors. This is what happened in the catch-up periods.
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Figure 3.9: Proximity to frontier and allocative efficiency, from a steady state with a
lower frontier, with half the overall estimated adjustment costs.
Notes: The initial allocation is theoretically optimal. The trend is slightly non-monotonic
because of the numerical error from discretization.
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Figure 3.10: Proximity to frontier and allocative efficiency, from a steady state with a
lower frontier, with double the overall estimated adjustment costs.
Notes: The initial allocation is theoretically optimal. The trend is slightly non-monotonic
because of the numerical error from discretization.
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Figure 3.11: Growth decomposition.
Notes: The decomposition follows Equation (3.11) in the Section 3.
The role of frictions – Although the paper highlights the importance of the stage of
development, the level of frictions is still crucial. Figure 3.9 shows the transitional
dynamics with half of the overall estimated adjustment costs. Figure 3.10 shows the
transitional dynamics with double of the overall estimated adjustment costs. The
pattern of the two transitions is the same as the former one, but the level of inef-
ficiency is different. Lower friction helps the economy pass catch-up periods more
smoothly. By contrast, higher friction generates higher inefficiency in the transition.
3.5.3 China in the future
In subsection, I simulate the world largest emerging economy, China, and show how
technological diffusion will eventually reduce the dispersion of productivity. The
simulation suggests that China has already passed the bottom of the U-shaped curve
and will converge to a more efficient distribution even without the reduction of fric-
tions.
§3.5 Results 59
Growth decomposition.– Aggregate productivity keeps growing in the simulation. The
average growth rate is 3.32%. The growth is driven by both technology progress and
efficiency improvement. Figure 3.11 decomposes the growth during the whole transi-
tional dynamics (see section 3 for the derivation of the decomposition). At the begin-
ning, the improvement in allocative efficiency contributes a large proportion because
of the transition from initial inefficiency. When the economy is close to steady state,
the impact from the efficiency channel becomes less significant. Technical progress
makes the main contribution in later economic growth.
Technological progress and allocative efficiency – Figure 3.12 shows the relationship be-
tween technical progress and allocative efficiency. Technology level is measured by
the average distance to the frontier, mean(zi,t/z f ,t). Allocative efficiency is measured
by the ratio of real productivity over optimal-allocation productivity (see equation
(3.10)). There is a clear positive relationship between technical progress and alloca-
tive efficiency. Since learning from the frontier is the only source of growth in the
model, the relationship can be explained as causal. When the emerging economy
catches up to the frontier, efficiency improvement can be a byproduct of technical
progress. The level of improvement is higher than in most literature (see the review
written by Restuccia & Rogerson, 2017), and even beyond the estimate by Hsieh and
Klenow (2009).
Firm dynamics – Figure 3.13 shows more details of the dynamics of the size distri-
bution. The market reallocates resources from the largest firms to relatively smaller
ones. It indicates that large firm occupied too many resources in the real data. The
size distribution keeps concentrating until it reaches stationary distribution. Along
with the increasing size of small firms, allocative efficiency also increases.
Figure 3.14 shows the dynamics of the Pearson correlation coefficient between
productivity zi,t and labour li,t. The correlation keeps increasing along with the con-
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Figure 3.12: Proximity to frontier and allocative efficiency.
Notes: The horizontal axis measures technology level of the economy (see Equation (3.9)).
The vertical axis measures allocative efficiency (see Equation (3.10)). Section 3 shows the
derivation of the measures. The initial distribution is from the real data in 2007.
Figure 3.13: The dynamics of size distribution
§3.6 Conclusions 61
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
year
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
co
rr
(z i
,t,
l i,t
)
Figure 3.14: The dynamics of the Pearson correlation coefficient between productivity
zi,t and labour li,t.
Notes: The initial distribution is from real data in 2007.
vergence. The correlation is relatively weak in the real data in 2007, since the alloca-
tion is quite inefficient. It increases dramatically at the beginning of the simulation,
and then, keeps increasing during the whole simulation. Finally, labour allocation is
highly determined by the productivity distribution. High-productivity firms occupy
more resources, low-productivity firms have less resources. The trend in the correla-
tion explains the dynamics of allocative efficiency, which also increases dramatically
at first, and then keeps increasing.
3.6 Conclusions
This study posts a new hypothesis on growth theory, that technical catch-up can
cause productivity dispersion temporarily high in emerging economies, and that the
dispersion can be low again in the long run. Simultaneously, new technology leads
severer friction-driven misallocation in the beginning and finally brings efficiency a-
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gain. The U-shaped patterns exist when technological diffusion is firm-specific and
factor market is frictional. Numerical experiments suggest that different stages of de-
velopment can largely explain the cross-country difference in productivity dispersion
and so-call allocative efficiency.
There are two natural directions for further investigation. First, analysing the
firm dynamics during whole catch-up process. This study suggests a pattern of the
dynamics of productivity distribution, yet the direct empirical evidence is still miss-
ing due to data availability. Second, decomposing the impact of level of distortions
and stage of development. This study suggests that both are important in explaining
inefficiency in emerging economies, but the relative importance of each component
is still an open empirical question.
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Appendix. Numerical method
The appendix describes the numerical methods used to solve the steady state and
transitional dynamics. I illustrate the structure of the algorithm first, and then, dis-
cuss some details.
Steady state – I make the economy stationary by removing growths of population and
technological frontiers, and then searching for the equilibrium wage in steady state
by Brent’s method. The labourers’ problem is trivial. The firms’ problem (3.7) is
solved by value function iteration. Given a guess of steady state wage, the algorithm
used to compute the steady state is as follows:
1. Guess the steady state wage w∗.
2. Guess value function by on-grid iteration.
3. Off-grid value function iteration from the initial guess.
4. Use the decision rules computing the new state.
5. Iterating the firms dynamics until converging to the stationary distribution.
6. Calculate the extra labour supply in the steady state.
The algorithm also provides the stationary distribution and the value function in the
steady state.
Transitional dynamics – I compute the transitional dynamics using the algorithm post-
ed by Conesa and Krueger (1999). I assume that the transition takes 100 periods
which is long enough to obtain convergence numerically. The algorithm includes the
following steps:
1. Use the steady state wage as the initial guess of the wage path.
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2. Given the wage path and the steady state value function, backwards compute
the value function for each period.
3. Given the value function, forwards compute the path of equilibrium wages
from the initial state.
4. Update the guess of the wage path until convergence.
I do one-step interpolation in the third step to improve the efficiency.
Discretization – I discretize the state space by a finite grid of labour li,t−1 and pro-
ductivity zi,t. However, the optimal choice is not restricted on the grid points. I
approximate the off-grid points by interpolation of a cubic spline. When the optimal
point is out of the grid, it will be assigned to the closest two grid points. Suppose
the optimal labour is l∗ for a measure 1 of firms, the closed two points are l1 and l2,
where l1 < l∗ < l2. Then, l2−l
∗
l2−l1 of the firms will be assigned to l1,
l∗−l1
l2−l1 of the firms
will be assigned to l2. To balance accuracy and computational speed, I use more grid
points in firm dynamics than in the value function iteration.
Measure of convergence.– Given two matrixes, I calculate the distance of each pair of
elements, and then, use the L2-norm of the distance matrix to measure the distance
of the matrixes. If the sum of the absolute value of the two elements is larger than
one, I use the sum as the denominator to normalize their distance. In this way, I can
control the scale effect.
The distance of the two distributions is measured by the distance of their mo-
ments. Since the first order moments (total labour supply, average productivity) are
fixed, I use the covariance matrix representing the distribution.
The baseline requirement of accuracy is 1e− 6. To reduce the computation time,
I use 1e− 3 when searching the wage path.
Chapter 4
Reallocation through Recession
4.1 Introduction
In emerging economies, low-productivity firms hold too many production resources.
Inefficient allocation generates significant loss on aggregate productivity (Bartels-
man, Haltiwanger, & Scarpetta, 2013; Hsieh & Klenow, 2009). In many countries,
the low-productivity firms are mainly state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As such, the
transformation of the state sector becomes a major engine of resource reallocation
and productivity growth. This transformation is likely to take place during an eco-
nomic recession. For example, the market-owned reforms of the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe began during the economic recessions in the 1980s. China’s major
SOE reform was implemented during the Asian Financial Crisis. This paper studies
the relationship between recessions and reallocation and suggests that recessions not
only inspire reforms, but also boost reallocation.
In this study, I build a growth model with two types of producers. The first,
SOEs, are less productive but initially larger, and the second, private firms, are more
productive but originally smaller. Along with the economic growth, private firms
accumulate more capital and finally dominate the market. As a result, the economy
achieves more efficient resource allocation and higher aggregate productivity.
Recessions boost reallocation. During a recession, SOEs are hit by a negative
productivity shock. They have to liquidate capital to repay their debt. Private firms
purchase capital from the liquidation market. As a result, capital is reallocated to
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more productive producers and aggregate productivity increases.
Recessions also lead to negative outcomes. Asides from direct productivity loss,
recesssion can lead to fire sales and slow capital accumulation. If private firms do
not have enough liquidity to purchase all the liquidated capital, households enter the
liquidation market. They do not hold production technology on capital, so only treat
capital as a form of saving. Their entry reduces production capital, drives the capital
(collateral) price down, and cuts external finance. The risk of fire sales only exists in
the early periods of the transformation. Once private firms become large enough to
purchase all liquidated capital, the risk disappears.
Because recessions create both positive and negative outcomes, the aggregate ef-
fect becomes a quantitative problem. I set the values of parameters based on Chinese
data, and then, quantitatively analyse the influence. The initial size difference is
taken from national account data in 1978. The number and productivity of the two
types of firms are taken from firm-level data from 2000 to 2007, the period between
the two financial crises. The rest are normalised or arbitrarily chosen to match the
model assumptions.
I simulate three transitional dynamics with different shocks: no shock, an early-
period shock with fire sales, and a late-arriving shock without fire sales. I use the
first scenario as the benchmark, and calculate the impact by comparing the latter two
with the benchmark. On the productivity side, both shocks boost later productivity
growth. The effect is smaller in the first scenario as capital cannot be fully reallo-
cated to private firms during fire sales. However, the effect influences the economy
from the beginning of the transition, so the cumulative effect can be significant. By
contrast, in the second scenario, the temporary productivity gain is larger, but the
cumulative effect can be small. On the capital side, only the early shock leads to
capital loss. After fire sales, capital accumulation remains lower than the benchmark
economy for a considerable amount of time but finally becomes higher due to the
increased aggregate productivity. The late shock does not lead to fire sales, so does
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not generate capital loss. The economy accumulates more capital immediately after
the recession.
The welfare effect is mixed. Both recessions harm the economy in the short term
but benefit the economy in the long term. The recession with fire sales generates
larger temporary loss and smaller temporary gain afterwards but, overall, larger
cumulative gain. The recession without fire sales generates smaller temporary loss,
larger temporary gain afterwards but relatively small cumulative gain.
This paper is related to discussions on the transformation of the state sector (D-
jankov & Murrell, 2002; Megginson & Netter, 2001; Murrell, 1993; Rodrik, 2006).
Many studies evaluate the transition based on short-term performance. This paper
suggests that the long-term outcome can be different to the short-term effect. A
recession that generates a short-term welfare loss may improve welfare in the long
term.
This paper is also related to the literature on resource allocation. Most studies
in this field suggest to improve efficiency by reducing distortions (Banerjee & Duflo,
2005; Hopenhayn, 2014a; Hsieh & Klenow, 2009; Restuccia & Rogerson, 2008; 2017).
This paper provides a new perspective: recessions also can improve efficiency and
boost long-term growth, despite causing temporary welfare loss.
Finally, this paper sits alongside the literature on the welfare and policy analysis
of recessions, specifically in the context of fire sales (Bianchi, 2016; Dávila & Korinek,
2017; Farhi & Tirole, 2012; Jeanne & Korinek, 2013; Lorenzoni, 2008; Shleifer & Vish-
ny, 2011). Compared to other discussions in the literature, this paper considers a
new channel that recessions can boost resource reallocation and benefit the economy
in the long term. The quantitative analysis suggests that even if a recession results
in fire sales and short-term welfare loss, the cumulative welfare effect still can be
positive.
I build a theoretical model in Section 2 and set parameter values in Section 3. In
Section 4, I discuss the impact of recessions in a simulated economy. Finally, Section
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5 concludes and discusses possible directions of future works.
4.2 Model
Agents – The model economy is populated by households with overlapping genera-
tions and two types of firms: private firms and SOEs. The measure of new house-
holds is m. The measures of SOEs and private firms are ml and mh. Every household
lives in the economy for two periods. They are consumers and debt holders. Firms
play the roles of producers and debt issuers. They hold the same production tech-
nology but with different levels of productivity. The initial sizes are also different.
SOEs are less productive but larger in the beginning. By contrast, private firms are
more productive but originally smaller.
Technology – The economy produces nondurable and durable goods, say consumption
goods and capital goods (capital). Households can store capital as part of their
savings, but do not hold production technology. By contrast, firms are able to use
capital to produce consumption goods. They consume a portion of their production
and use the rest for debt repayment and investment. For the sake of simplicity, self-
consumption is assumed to be nontradeable, and fixed as a proportion γ of the total
output (Kiyotaki & Moore, 1997). The technology is constant return to scale. The
production function of tradeable consumption goods is given as:
f (ki,t) = zi,tki,t, (4.1)
where zi,t equals (1− γ) times the productivity of all consumption goods. This study
focuses on the transformation of SOEs, so ignores the uncertainty of the productivity
of private firms and assumes it is equal to a constant value zh. The productivity
of SOEs is independent and identically distributed over time, as described in the
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following stochastic process:
zi,t = zlbηt , b ∈ (0, 1), ηt ∼i.i.d. B(1, p). (4.2)
zl is the baseline productivity of SOEs that is strictly lower than zh. When a negative
shock hits the economy, the productivity of SOEs becomes an even lower value, zlb.
The occurrence of recession follows Bernoulli distribution with the probability p. The
productivity process is common knowledge in the economy.
Firms accumulate capital through two channels. They can build capital from final
goods with a constant return to scale technology. The productivity is normalised as
one. In other words, firms evaluate capital as the final goods used in its construction.
Alternatively, firms can purchase capital from the market when other firms liquidate
assets. More details about the liquidation market will be discussed later.
Financial markets – Firms can issue debts in the debt market. Young households
will purchase debt to smooth consumption across periods. Households live for two
periods, so all debts must be repaid in the next period. Firms face two kinds of
constraints in the financial market: liquidity and collateral constraint.
Final goods are the liquidity of the economy. Firms repay their debt with the final
goods they produce. They are not allowed to reschedule or refinance their debt. If
the liquidity is not enough as in the following equation:
zi,tki,t < Rtdi,t−1, (4.3)
in which Rt is the interest rate at period t and di,t−1 is the level of debt at period
t− 1, they must liquidate a part of their capital (Rtdi,t−1− zi,tki,t)/qt to cover the rest
of their debt, where qt is the asset price at period t. As previously assumed, the
negative shock only applies to SOEs. When SOEs face a liquidity shortage, private
firms and households have enough liquidity to purchase the liquidated assets from
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SOEs. The asset price is determined by demand side. Private firms would like to pay
one unit of final goods for one unit of liquidated assets, the same as how much they
spend for building new capital. If private firms have enough liquidity to purchase all
liquidated assets, the liquidation market will reallocate capital to more productive
producers without generating any externality or social welfare loss, otherwise the
market suffers from the loss of fire sales.
Young households enter the liquidation market when private firms cannot pro-
vide enough liquidity:
∑
i
zi,tki,t <∑
i
Rtdi,t−1. (4.4)
They purchase the remaining liquidated assets as a part of saving. Households e-
valuate capital the same as debt, so they are willing to pay the price E(qt+1/Rt+1).
For the sake of simplicity, their predictions on capital price and interest rate are as-
sumed to be adaptive. This assumption will be adjusted in the future works. They
bid qt/Rt for one unit of capital. This is lower than the capital price in normal pe-
riods. Thus, the entry of households drives the dramatic devaluation of capital that
leads to three outcomes. First, private firms can afford more capital than before and
more resources are reallocated to more productive producers. Second, the devaluat-
ed collateral reduces external finance of all firms, damaging capital accumulation in
the economy. Third, households hold capital but do not use that capital for produc-
tion. This directly reduces total output, consumption, and social welfare. The last
two negative effects leave a space of government intervention. The assumption that
households do not hold production technology captures the same idea of assuming
expertise on operating capital. This kind of assumption underpins most models on
fire sales since Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) made the
original contributions.
The risk of fire sales only exists in the early periods of transition. In that time,
the liquidated assets of SOEs are too large for private firms due to the imbalance of
initial firm sizes. Private firms narrow the size gap by their higher productivity and
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are eventually able to afford all liquidated assets. The absence of the risk of fire sales
eliminates the necessity of government intervention.
Aside from liquidity constraint, firms also collateral constraint in the debt market.
They use capital as collateral. When a firm issues a debt, the amount cannot exceed
a proportion φ of the collateral value, as given by:
Rt+1di,t ≤ φ · qtki,t. (4.5)
The further capital value ki,t+1qt+1 is uncertain because of the risk of liquidation.
The market are assumed to use the current value qtki,t as the adaptive expectation of
the future value. The pecuniary externality of liquidation generates a real effect on
capital accumulation in the same period. When a fire sale occurs, qt reduces from the
normal value of 1 to the fire-sale price qt/Rt. The devaluation of collateral means that
it is more difficult to get external finance. This increases the necessity of government
intervention. The leverage ratio φ is assumed in the following range:
φ ∈ (zlb, zl ]. (4.6)
This range determines the liquidation risk of firms. Under this assumption, SOEs
have abundant liquidity in normal periods but face liquidity shortage when they are
hit by a negative productivity shock. They need to liquidate assets during recessions.
Private firms always hold extra liquidity after debt repayment. Although they are
buyers in the liquidation market, they may not possess enough funds to purchase all
liquidated assets. In this case, a fire sale occurs.
Household’s problem – A representative household lives in the economy for two pe-
riods. When it is born at the period t, it receives an endowment of asset at that
increases along with economic growth. By this assumption, households also enjoy
the benefit of economic growth. In the benchmark set-up, endowment increases at
72 Reallocation through Recession
the same rate as capital accumulation,
at = zl∑
i
ki,t. (4.7)
Young households spend a portion of their endowment to purchase debt or capital
for the sake of smoothing consumption.
During a normal period, firm debts are the sole financial tool. Households con-
sider the following problem:
max
ct,c′t
u(ct) +
1
Rt+1
u(c′t+1), (4.8)
subject to
ct +
1
Rt+1
c′t+1 ≤ at, (4.9)
where ct represents consumption in the young period, c′t+1 represents consumption
in the old period. The utility of the representative household is a weighted summa-
tion of utilities in the two periods. The one-period utility function u(·) is increasing,
strictly concave, and satisfies the Inada condition. The logarithmic form is used as
the baseline case:
u(c) = ln(c). (4.10)
The subjective discount rate is assumed to be the inverse of the current interest rate.
As the result of the problem, households equally allocate consumptions over the two
periods, as shown in Equation (4.11):
ct = c′t+1 =
Rt+1
1+ Rt+1
at. (4.11)
The debt dhh,t they hold is determined by the following equation:
dhh,t =
1
1+ Rt+1
at. (4.12)
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As shown in Equation (4.12), the demand of intertemporal transfer decreases when
the interest rate Rt+1 increases. This is due to wealth effect. When Rt+1 increases, the
future value of the endowment at also increases, resulting in households that prefer
to consume more and to save less.
During fire sales, households achieve the goal of consumption smoothing in both
liquidation and debt markets. They purchase capital in liquidation market first and
purchase debt in debt market later. When households enter the debt market, they
can adjust the expectation of the interest rate, but not the asset price. As shuch, the
budget constraint becomes:
ct +
1
Rt+1
c′t+1 ≤ at + qtkhh,t∆
1
Rt+1
, (4.13)
where khh,t is the capital households purchase in the liquidation market. The last
term represents the prediction error of the interest rate. As a result, the consumption
of young households becomes:
ct =
Rt+1
1+ Rt+1
(at + qtkhh,t∆
1
Rt+1
). (4.14)
The debt they purchase becomes:
dhh,t = at − qtkhh,t 1+ Rt(1+ Rt+1)Rt . (4.15)
The consumption of old households becomes:
c′t+1 = Rt+1at + qt+1kh,t − qtkh,t
Rt+1(1+ Rr)
(1+ Rt + 1)Rt
. (4.16)
Compared with the economy without fire sales, the solutions of ct and dhh,t include
prediction error in the interest rate. The solution of c′t+1 includes prediction errors of
both the interest rate and the asset price.
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Firm’s problem – Figure 4.1 depicts the time line of a firm. At the beginning of each pe-
riod, the firm realizes its productivity and produces consumption goods. Production
depends on realised productivity and the capital accumulated in previous period.
It consumes the nontradeable consumption goods, and repays their debt with what
remains. If that is not enough (for a SOE), the firm liquidates capital. If it is too much
(for a private firm), the firm will use the excess liquidity to purchase the liquidated
capital. At the end of the period, it issues new debt based on the remaining capital
(collateral) and invests in new capital for the next period.
Realize productivity
Production
Enough liquid Liquidation
Repay old debt Repay old debt
Buy capital (optional)
Issue new debt
Investment
Yes
Next period
No
Figure 4.1: Time line of a firm
Given the productivity zi,t, capital ki,t, and debt di,t−1 issued during the last peri-
od, a firm considers the following Bellman equation,
V(zi,t, ki,t, di,t−1) = max
ki,t+1,di,t
u
(
γ
1− γ zi,tki,t
)
+E
1
Rt+1
V(zi,t+1, ki,t+1, di,t), (4.17)
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where γ1−γzi,tki,t is the self consumption of the firm. The utility function u(·) is
assumed to be the same as that of households. The budget constraint is as follows:
Rtdi,t−1 + lli,t · 1lli,t>0 + ∆ki,t+1 ≤ zi,tki,t + di,t. (4.18)
The firm obtains the output zi,tki,t and debt di,t. They use the income to repay the
debt issued in the last period Rtdi,t−1, and invest in new capital ∆ki,t+1. It also needs
to pay the value loss lli,t in the case of liquidation, in which:
lli,t = qt ·
Rtdi,t−1 − zi,tki,t
1− qt . (4.19)
The firm is also subject to the collateral constraint shown in Equation (4.5). Given
these assumptions, collateral constraint is binding. As such, the firm’s problem is
trivial. The optimal debt level is given by:
di,t = φ
qtki,t
Rt+1
. (4.20)
Equilibrium – Definition 5 describes the recursive competitive equilibrium of the mod-
el.
Definition 5 A recursive competitive equilibrium of the model is an interest rate system that
satisfies the conditions of (i) household optimisation; (ii) firm optimisation; (iii) liquidation
market clear; (iv) debt market clear.
4.3 Parameter values
I set the parameter values to match the SOE transformation in China. The initial dis-
tribution is from the national account data provided by the Chinese National Bureau
of Statistics (NBS). The definition of ownership here follows the NBS. The number
and productivity of the firms are from NBS firm-level data. The data period is from
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2000 to 2007, a stable period between the Asian Financial Crisis and the Global Finan-
cial Crisis. The data processing follows Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2014).
In the data, a firm is defined to be a SOE if the state owns no less than half of its
shares or is the controlling share holder. The rest of parameter values are normalised
or arbitrarily chosen to match the model assumptions.
Table 4.1 summarises the choices of the values. The measure of households m is
normalised as 1, as is the measure of SOEs ml . The measure of private firms mh is the
ratio of the number of SOEs to the number of private firms in NBS firm-level data.
The production function is assumed to be constant return to scale, so the productivity
is the output capital ratio. zi,t is the productivity of tradable consumption good, so
equals to the original productivity times 1 − γ. The productivity of private firms
zh is 1− γ times the average output capital ratio of all private manufacturing firms
in NBS firm-level data. The baseline productivity of SOEs zl is calculated by the
same way. The negative productivity shock b is arbitrary. I assume the shock halves
productivity. The initial capital of private firms kh,0 is normalized as 1. Therefore,
the initial capital of SOEs kl,0 is a ratio of the initial sizes of the two types of firms.
The average initial size of SOEs is calculated from the total capital of SOEs and the
number of SOEs in 1978. There were almost no private firms at that time. As such,
I use the average disposable income per capita in 1978 as the initial investment of
private firms. The leverage ratio φ is arbitrary. This value satisfies condition (4.6).
Thus, only SOEs suffer the risk of liquidation.
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4.4 Simulations
In this section, I simulate the economy with different shocks and identify the impact
by comparing transitional paths. The first scenario is the transition without any
shocks. This is the benchmark of the analysis. In the second scenario, a negative
productivity shock hits SOEs in the second period of the transition. Because of the
imbalanced initial sizes, private firms are too small to purchase all liquidated assets.
The shock leads to fire sales. In the third scenario, a shock hits the economy in
the 34th period. This is the first period in which private firms are large enough to
purchase all liquidated assets.
4.4.1 The transformation of the state sector
Figure 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 demonstrate the transformation of the state sector with re-
cessions occurring in different periods. The blue lines show the benchmark transfor-
mation without recessions, the yellow lines show the transformation with a recession
and fire sales, and the red lines show the transformation with a recession but without
fire sales.
Figure 4.2 shows the dynamics of the size difference between the two types of
firms. The economy begins in an unbalanced state in which SOEs are much larger
than private firms. Both SOEs and private firms continue to accumulate capital dur-
ing the transition but the speeds of capital accumulation are different. The private
sector accumulates capital faster due to higher productivity. Finally, the size differ-
ence reverses to the opposite direction and the curve passes the horizontal line of
0. The size of private firms becomes larger than the size of SOEs. Before reverting,
private firms can already afford all liquidated assets, as they are more than SOEs.
Capital accumulation will be discussed in further detail later.
Recessions boost resource reallocation but timing remains important. In the fire-
sale scenario, private firms cannot afford all liquidated assets. As such, the impact
on the size difference is relatively smaller. In the scenario without fire sales, private
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Figure 4.2: The dynamics of size difference between SOEs and private firms.
Notes: The difference is measured by logarithmic capital ratio.
firms are large enough to take over all liquidated capital. The recession generates a
relatively larger impact on resource reallocation, as shown in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.3 demonstrates the dynamics of the proportion of capital held by SOEs.
At the start, SOEs hold most capital of the economy. Later, the share decreases due
to different productivity. Finally, private firms own most capital of the economy.
Recessions boost this transition. The effect also depends on timing. The pattern is
the same as that shown in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.4 shows the dynamics of the market share of SOEs. Because the produc-
tivity difference between the two types of firms is fixed during the booming periods,
the dynamics of market share represent capital dynamics. At the start of the transfor-
mation, SOEs occupy most of the market share. Later, private firms slowly take over
the market and finally occupy almost the entire market. Recessions boost this pro-
cess. A recession without fire sales generates a greater effect on the transformation,
as it reallocates more capital to private firms.
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Figure 4.3: The dynamics of the proportion of capital occupied by SOEs.
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Figure 4.4: The dynamics of the market share of SOEs.
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Figure 4.5: The dynamics of logarithmic aggregate productivity.
4.4.2 Productivity growth
Figure 4.5 demonstrates the dynamics of aggregate productivity that is a weighted
combination of the productivity of SOEs and private firms. The weight is the capital
share. Larger shares of private firms indicate higher aggregate productivity. Through
this channel, the economic transformation boosts productivity growth. In the begin-
ning, aggregate productivity represents the productivity of SOEs, as SOEs hold most
of the capital. Next, it increases with the increasing share of high-productivity private
firms. Finally, private firms dominate the market. Aggregate productivity represents
their productivity.
Recessions reduce short-term productivity and boost the transition but they can-
not influence long-term productivity. The impact is through two channels. First,
recessions directly reduce the productivity of SOEs for one period. Second, reces-
sions reallocate more capital to high-productivity producers. The two channels work
in opposite directions. The first channel dominates in the short term. Therefore,
productivity decreases during recessions before the productivity of SOEs recovers to
the normal level. More efficient capital allocation boosts the transformation. Produc-
tivity growth is faster than in the benchmark economy. However, the recessions only
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influence the speed rather than the target of the transition. In the long term, private
firms dominate the market in all cases. Hence, long-term aggregate productivity is
determined by the productivity of private firms rather than recessions.
As shown in Figure 4.5, the size of the impacts depend on timing. A recession
with fire sales generates larger short-term productivity loss and smaller productivity
gain afterwards. The large immediate loss is primarily from the productivity loss of
SOEs. This channel is more influential in the early stage because of the large initial
size of SOEs. By contrast, the impact of capital reallocation is limited. Liquidat-
ed capital cannot be fully reallocated to private firms during fire sales. Insufficient
capital reallocation is powerless to substantially boost productivity growth. Thus,
the aggregate effect on productivity is extremely negative during the recession. Af-
terwards, productivity recovers to a normal value and grows faster due to more
efficient capital allocation. This acceleration is less than in the scenario without fire
sales because of the insufficient reallocation. However, as the recession boosts trans-
formation at the early stage, the cumulative effect can be considerate. By contrast,
the later recession generates less short-term productivity loss and more productivity
gain afterwards. Smaller loss is achieved with a smaller share of SOEs and sufficient
capital reallocation. Later, more efficient capital allocation further boosts transforma-
tion and productivity growth. However, the greater acceleration only influences the
later segment of the transition. As such the cumulative effect may not be significant.
4.4.3 Capital accumulation
Recessions affect capital accumulation but the impact is limited. Figure 4.6 shows
three dynamics of capital. Capital continues to increase in all three economies and
recessions do not considerably change this trend. In the scenario without fire sales,
the recession boosts capital reallocation without any loss. In the scenario with fire
sales, the recession generates a negative effect on capital accumulation. The effectt is
limited for two reasons. First, fire sales only apply to the extra asset which private
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Figure 4.6: The dynamics of logarithmic total capital.
firms cannot afford, so the amount is limited. Second, the fire-sale assets will be
resold to firms again in the next period, rendering the negative effect temporary. As
a result, recessions mainly influence capital allocation rather than accumulation.
Figure 4.7 shows further details of the impact of recessions. For comparison and
detrend, I use the economy without any recessions as the benchmark and calculate
the relative capital accumulation. Subgraph 4.7(a) and 4.7(b) show the relative capi-
tal accumulation of SOEs and private firms. The capital of SOEs relatively declines
during recessions, and never recovers to the benchmark level. The impact is similar
in private firms, but in the opposite direction. The recessions influence capital accu-
mulation in both the short and long term, while the short-term effect is larger. The
pattern matches the impact on transformation. The recessions reallocate capital to
high-productivity producers, a change that is permanent.
Subgraph 4.7(c) shows the dynamics of total capital. The peak of the impact is
within four percent of the benchmark total capital and long-term effects are within
two percent of the benchmark value. This matches the small movement shown in
Figure 4.6. In the scenario without fire sales, capital is directly reallocated to the pri-
vate sector without any loss. Because high-productivity firms hold more production
resources, later capital accumulation is faster than in the benchmark economy. In
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Figure 4.7: Relative capital accumulation.
Notes: Capital is measure by the ratio of logarithmic capital to the benchmark value.
the scenario with fire sales, the recession leads to temporary loss of total capital. It
comes close to returning to the benchmark level when households resell the capital
in the following period. The more efficient capital allocation boosts capital accumu-
lation in which the speed of accumulation is faster than in the benchmark economy.
Finally, the total capital becomes higher than in the benchmark economy. However,
due to fire-sale loss, the amount of capital remains lower than in the economy with-
out fire sales. In the long term, all economies are dominated by private firms, so the
allocation effect is weakened. The difference among the three economies reduces.
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4.4.4 Output
The total output of the economy is determined by aggregate productivity and total
capital. Continuous productivity growth and capital accumulation force output to
continue to increase in all three scenarios. Figure 4.8 shows the output dynamics
of three simulations. Output is measured by the logarithmic output divided by the
benchmark value. The pattern of the dynamics is similar to the pattern of capital
dynamics and the scale is larger due to the productivity channel.
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(b) Output of private firms.
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Figure 4.8: The dynamics of relative output.
Notes: Output is measured by the ratio of logarithmic output to the benchmark value.
Subgraph 4.8(a) and 4.8(b) show the output dynamics of SOEs and private firms.
The dynamics of private firms are exactly the same as the capital dynamics, as their
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productivity is constant. The difference between the graphs is purely driven by
the logarithmic transformation. For SOEs, output drops further than capital due to
productivity decline during recessions.
Subgraphs 4.8(c) shows the aggregate effect. In the scenario with fire sales, loga-
rithmic output drops to 92.07 percent of the benchmark output. This is a consequence
of both direct productivity loss of SOEs and capital loss during fire sales. The output
decline is greater when the recession hits the economy during the early stage of the
transformation, as productivity shocks target SOEs and SOEs are relatively larger
in this stage. Immediately after the recession, output recovers and almost returns
to the benchmark value. The recovery is in both the productivity and capital sides:
productivity returns to the normal value and the fire-sale capital is resold to to firms.
Afterwards, output grows faster than in the benchmark economy and finally reaches
a higher value in the long term.
In the scenario without fire sales, short-term output loss is purely driven by pro-
ductivity loss rather than capital accumulation. As shown in Figure 4.5, productivity
decreases slightly during the recession, so output also decreases slightly. Then, pro-
ductivity growth and capital accumulation together boost output growth. As such
output quickly recovers and becomes higher than both the benchmark value and the
output of the fire-sale economy. However, the output boom only occurs later in the
transformation, so the cumulative effect may not be significant.
4.4.5 Consumption
Figure 4.9 shows the consumption dynamics of the economy. Subgraphs 4.9(a) and
4.9(b) show the consumption dynamics of young and old households. Households
distribute endowments to equalise their consumptions over two periods. As a result,
the pattern of the two dynamics are similar but the dynamics of old households delay
for one period. Because of prediction errors, the dynamics of the two generations
are slightly different during recessions. As assumed in Equation (4.7), household
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endowment represents capital accumulation in the economy. The future value also
depends on interest rate. In booming periods, interest rate is constant constant over
time, so consumption dynamics represent the capital dynamics. In a recession period,
future value decreases due to lower interest rate, so households consume less and
save more. In the scenario with fire sales, logarithmic total capital declines to 96.14
percent of the benchmark value. Household consumption decreases even further,
equals to 95.13 percent of the benchmark value. In the scenario without fire sales,
capital does not decline but household consumption decreases due to lower interest
rate and lower future value of their endowments.
Subgraphs 4.9(c) and 4.9(d) show the consumption dynamics of SOEs and pri-
vate firms. All firms consume a fixed portion of their production, so consumption
dynamics directly represent output dynamics. The differences to output dynamics
are purely driven by logarithmic transformation.
Subgraph 4.9(e) plots the dynamics of total consumption, that is a weighted sum-
mation of the above four dynamics and the weight is their population. The pattern
is similar to the dynamics of total output.
4.4.6 Welfare
The dynamics of individual utilities are represented by their consumptions, which
are discussed in previous subsection. As assumed in Equation (10), utilities are the
logarithmic transformation of consumptions, so their dynamics are identical to the
dynamics of logarithmic consumption.
Figure 4.10 demonstrates the dynamics of single-period social welfare. The social
welfare function is utilitarian that is the weighted summation of individual utilities
and the weight is the population of each group. In the scenario with fire sales, capital
and output are lower in total than the benchmark level for a long time. However,
social welfare declines for only two periods, and then, grows even higher than the
benchmark value. The rapid recovery is driven by the considerable utility gain of
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private firms. Although all others suffer utility loss for a long time, the utility gain of
private firms is large enough to boost the catch-up of social welfare. In the scenario
without fire sales, the pattern is similar to output dynamics: social welfare sightly
declines, and then, grows higher than other two economies soon after the recession.
The cumulative effect on social welfare is different with the short-term effect.
The recession with fire sales generates a greater welfare loss during the recession,
a smaller short-term gain afterwards, but a larger cumulative gain. By contrast, the
recession without fire sales generates a smaller welfare loss during the recession, a
larger temporary gain afterwards, but a smaller cumulative gain. In the scenario
with fire sales, welfare drops to 93.18 percent of the benchmark value and increases
to up to 102.26 percent afterwards. The cumulative gain is 14.98 percent.1 In the
scenario without fire sales, welfare declines to 98.79 percent of the benchmark value
and soon grows to up to 102.54 percent. However, the cumulative gain is only 3.77
percent of the benchmark value. The different cumulative effect is due to timing. The
first recession arrives at the beginning of the transition, influencing almost the entire
transitional dynamics. Although the short-term effect is limited, the cumulative effect
is greater. By contrast, the second recession hits the economy during the late segment
of the transition, and while the short-term effect is greater, the cumulative effect is
relatively small in limited time.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter studies the role of recessions in the transformation of the state sector.
In the model economy, recessions reallocate capital to the private sector and boost
long-term growth. On the other hand, recessions cause short-term loss of output,
consumption, and social welfare. The positive effect dominates in all simulations.
Recessions generate gains on cumulative welfare. The timing of a recession is impor-
1The value is the overall welfare gain over one-hundred simulation periods and discounted to the
net value in the first period. When the simulation is expanded to longer horizon, the result nearly does
not change. The reason is that the net values of long-run gains are tiny after discounted exponentially
and the welfare effect is dominated by early-period gains.
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tant. In the early stage of the transformation, a recession leads to larger temporary
loss, as private firms are too small to take over all the resources released by SOEs.
However, it boosts transformation for a longer length of time, so generates more
significant cumulative welfare gain than later recessions.
Model assumptions and estimations are simplified in the current version. These
will be adjusted in future versions. For instance, the assumption of adaptive expec-
tation will be modified to rational expectation. In addition, the current welfare effect
depends on the parameter environment. A natural extension is the sensitivity test of
important parameters, such as the productivity difference between SOEs and private
firms and the size of negative shocks. This can provide more insight on the welfare
and policy analysis.
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Figure 4.9: The dynamics of relative consumption.
Notes: Consumption is measured by the ratio of logarithmic consumption to the benchmark
value.
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Figure 4.10: The dynamics of relative social welfare
Notes: The measures are the ratios to the benchmark values.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis comprises three essays on firm dynamics and development. Each essay
extends the literature on allocative efficiency and development in a different direc-
tion. In this concluding chapter, I summarise the key findings of each essay and
suggest avenues for further research.
In Chapter 2, I find that the improvement of allocative efficiency is able to ex-
plain a large proportion of miraculous growth. I study the transitional dynamics
of an economy that is populated by heterogenous firms. Allocative efficiency im-
proves when only more productive firms survive and they are allocated more pro-
duction resources. Adjustment frictions and entry/exit barriers delay the efficiency
improvement for decades. Meanwhile, the slow efficiency improvement continues to
contribute to growth. The growth rate is consequently high. Eventually, the growth
miracle disappears once the allocative efficiency reaches the stationary level.
Chapter 2 reveals the importance of efficiency improvement in a simulated econ-
omy, yet the quantitative importance of this channel in the real world remains an
empirical question. The answer of this question could be country-specific. Decom-
posing the growth of a miraculous economy will provide further insights into the
contribution of efficiency improvement. Such analysis relies on rich and sufficiently
long firm-level panel data.
In Chapter 3, I find that technological diffusion could cause higher productivity
dispersion in emerging economies. In these ecnomies, the productivity distribution
may become narrow again even when distortions remain the same. Firms in the
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model learn about new technology from the world frontier. Different learning speeds
lead to a dispersed productivity distribution in the catch-up process. When firms
face adjustment costs, the dispersion of marginal productivity also increases. After
a long period of learning, slow learners also move closer to the frontier. Finally,
the dispersions are low again. This result suggests that high productivity dispersion
does not necessarily indicate high-level distortions, but may also represent a stage of
development.
Chapter 3 provides a hypothesis on productivity dispersion in emerging economies.
More empirical evidences are necessary to show the quantitative importance of the
hypothesis. Future investigations should seek to decompose the dispersion differ-
ences between emerging and a developed economies, examine the contribution of
the stages of development.
In Chapter 4, I suggest that recessions also can be a channel of improving effi-
ciency. In the model economy, recessions boost the transformation of the state sector
by reallocating more capital to private firms. During a recession, state-owned enter-
prises liquidate capital for debt repayments. Private firms take over the liquidated
capital. The reallocation improves efficiency and boosts long-run growth. On the
other hand, recessions lead to temporary loss of productivity, output, and welfare,
but the cumulative welfare effect is nonetheless positive. The timing of a recession
is important. An early recession with fire sales results in large temporary losses, s-
low recovery, but large cumulative welfare gain, as it boosts the transformation for a
longer time. By contrast, a late-arriving recession results in smaller temporary losses,
faster recovery, but relatively small cumulative welfare gain.
Some assumptions and estimations are simplified in Chapter 4, which will be
adjusted in further works. For example, the assumption of adaptive expectation will
be modified to rational expectation. Furthermore, it should be noted that the current
results are calculated based on the assigned parameters. A sensitivity test of the
parameter environment could better the understanding of welfare effect.
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